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I. Introduction  
 Discussing federal statutes, Justice Scalia tells us that “[t]he stark reality is that the only 
thing that one can say for sure was agreed to by both houses and the president (on signing the 
bill) is the text of the statute. The rest is legal fiction."1  
 How should we take this claim? If we take "text" to mean the printed text, that text 
without more is just a series of marks.  Agreement on a series of marks without more has no 
meaning in itself.  In struggling with Justice Scalia's remarks, we thus must ask whether on the 
face of these remarks he has committed the fallacy of conflating signifiers of meaning with 
meaning itself.  Legislators do not agree simply on certain ink marks but on what they believe 
those ink marks signify.2  Their duty is to legislate, not to produce mere marks of ink. 
 If we instead take "text" to embody something off the page, such as the "meaning" of the 
series of marks at issue, what is that meaning and how do we know that all the legislators 
"agreed" on that "meaning"?  The series of marks itself cannot prove such unanimity, much less 
any specific meaning.  Even if we take such off-the-page text as referring to words with standard 
or dictionary meanings, we know that words have multiple such meanings (“left,” for example, 
can mean, among other things, a direction or the past tense of “leave”). A series of marks 
                                                 
1 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
376 (2012).   
2 Justice Scalia no doubt understands that the meaning is not in the ink itself.  He, for example, 
allows for the correction of scrivener's errors in certain cases, id. at 234-39, and acknowledges 
the role of context in determining meaning, see id. at 16, 20, 33, although he would restrict use 
of such critical context as legislative history. id. at 369-90. 
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referring to a series of words in itself thus does not tell us which standard meanings were in the 
heads of legislators when they read (if they did) drafts of the bill.3   
 In struggling with Justice Scalia's claim, we have necessarily delved into semiotics (i.e., 
the “general theory of signs”4) by noting that meaningful ink marks signify a meaning beyond 
themselves.  The meaning is thus not in the ink but in what the ink signifies.  As discussed 
below, a meaningful ink mark is a “signifier" of meaning (the "signified").  
 As this example shows, understanding how signifiers of signs function is critical to good 
judging and lawyering.  We risk error if we look only at the signifiers which have no meaning in 
themselves apart from what they signify.  Our task instead is to seek the signified, which, again, 
lies beyond the signifier.5   
 Additionally, a failure to understand how signs function can limit legal analysis and 
rhetoric by focusing on words to the detriment of other signs.  As we shall see below, words are 
just one type of sign, and legal analysis and rhetoric are therefore greatly impoverished if we 
ignore other sign types.  Consistent with such impoverishment, we often hear that words are the 
lawyer’s tools.  Rather than words alone, this article will claim that signs in their vast array 
(including but not limited to words) are the lawyer’s fundamental tools.6 
                                                 
3 Thus, we would also want to question Justice Scalia’s claim that “a majority [of legislators] has 
undeniably agreed on the final language that passes into law.  That is all they have agreed upon . 
. . .” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 393.  
4 CHARLES MORRIS, SIGNIFICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONS OF SIGNS 
AND VALUES 1 (3d ed. 1968). 
5 I have challenged naïve textualism elsewhere and will therefore not explore that specific issue 
in detail in this article.  See generally Harold A. Lloyd, Law’s “Way of Words”: Pragmatics and 
Textualist Error, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 221 (2016). 
6 Signs are, of course, all others’ tools as well. As Charles Sanders Peirce notes, and as I hope 
this article will help demonstrate, “the universe . . . is perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
exclusively of signs.”  5 & 6 CHARLES SANDERS PIERCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES 
SANDERS PIERCE 5.448 n.1 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1963).  
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 This article therefore broadly explores semiotics through a lawyer's lens, hopefully 
simplifying as much as possible much of the complex, divergent, and frankly sometimes baffling 
terminology used by those who explore semiotics. This article will first continue below with a 
general definition of signs and the related notion of intentionality.  It will then address the 
structure and concomitants of signs, the nature of speech acts that are of interest to lawyers, the 
sign classifications used in legal analysis and rhetoric, the role of signs in careful legal thought 
and good legal rhetoric, the unfolding of the signified and the fixation of meaning debate, the 
semiotics of speaker vs. reader meaning, and some brief reflections on semiotics and the First 
Amendment. Finally, this article also provides an Appendix with further terms and concepts 
helpful to lawyers exploring semiotics.  
 I hope this article's broad overview of semiotics underscores the vital importance of 
semiotics in law and in legal education reform.  I also hope this article inspires readers and legal 
education reformers to explore the vast worlds of semiotics that elude the page constraints of a 
general overview. 
II. Definition and Function of Signs, Semiotics, and Related Terms 
 Given the many interrelated parts of semiotics, one must make a judgment call as to 
where to begin.  My judgment call is to begin with the definition of a sign and to build from 
there. 
 A. Definition of Sign 
 A “sign” consists of a co-related signifier and signified, where the signifier is used to 
“represent” “something else,”7 i.e., the signified.8  Or as Eco puts it, "The sign is usually 
                                                 
7 See 1 & 2 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 2.27-
2.32 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1960).  In Peircean terms, a signifier can also be 
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considered as a correlation between a signifier and a signified (or between expression and 
content) and therefore as an action between pairs."9 I explore in more detail in Section III. below 
the nature and interrelation of a signifier and a signified.   
 One should take care at the outset not to confuse "sign" as above defined with "signifier." 
Such confusion is all too easy in ordinary language.  For example, we speak of a stop sign or a 
no parking sign.  Strictly speaking, of course, as I have defined the terms, we should speak of a 
"signifier" in each such case if we mean to speak of the physical objects posted to refer to the 
obligation to stop where the signifier directs or avoid parking where the signifier directs.  
Unfortunately, in semiotic literature, the term "sign" can be used for "signifier,"10 and the reader 
must therefore take care when reading such literature and substitute "signifier" for "sign" where 
appropriate.11  
B. Signs and Intentionality 
Since signs involve signifiers that point to something else, signs involve what 
philosophers call "intentionality."  Intentionality recognizes that "[o]ur beliefs, thoughts, wishes, 
                                                                                                                                                             
said to be "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity."  Id. 
at 2.28.  
8 Not everyone agrees with the two-part structure of signs adopted here.  For a brief table of 
various conceptions of the basic structure of signs.  See WINFRIED NÖTH, HANDBOOK OF 
SEMIOTICS 88 (1995). 
9 UMBERTO ECO, SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 1 (1986).  
10 For example, Clarke tells us that "[a] sign is any object of interpretation, the thing or event that 
has significance for some interpreter.  It can stand for some object for this interpreter, signifying 
an action to be performed, arouse in the interpreter of feeling or emotion, or combine two or 
more of these functions."  D.S. CLARKE, JR., SOURCES OF SEMIOTIC: READING WITH 
COMMENTARY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 1 (1990).  Peirce speaks more carefully in the 
following passage: “A sign, or representamen [i.e., signifier], is something which stands to 
somebody for something in some capacity.”  PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.28.  However, elsewhere, 
he is not so careful.  See id. at 2.230.  Nöth notes that “in order that anything should be a Sign, it 
must ‘represent,’ as we say, something else, called its Object . . . .”  NÖTH, supra note 8, at 80.  
11 See also NÖTH, supra note 8, at 79 (also discussing such confusion in the literature).  
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dreams, and desires are about things," and intentionality is thus "[t]he directedness or ‘aboutness’ 
of many, if not all, conscious states."12  As John R. Searle therefore defines the term, 
"intentionality" is “that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at 
or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.”13  Intentionality also includes "the 
property of mental phenomena whereby the mind can contemplate non-existent objects and states 
of affairs."14  Thus, “I will have your lease ready tomorrow” is intentional to the extent it 
signifies a lease (presently existing or not) that will be ready tomorrow. 
In addition to intentional states such as “beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires” that are 
intentional in themselves (since they are mental states directed outward), intentionality can flow 
derivatively from mind as well and the intention by which an act is performed.15  For example, a 
legal drafting computer program can include signifiers that signify because someone has 
constructed the program with such intention.16  A computer program (such as a legal software 
program) can also have intentionality when someone reads it as signifying something.17  The 
divergence of speaker and hearer meaning can be of great importance for lawyers, and I discuss 
and contrast speaker and reader meaning (as well as whose meaning should control) in Section 
VII below. 
Whether we focus on speaker or hearer meaning in the case of text, for example, such 
meaning cannot of course be simply equated with the ink marks on a page. Without more, such 
                                                 
12 See Intentionality, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (3d ed. 2016). 
13 JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 1 (1983).  
14 Intentionality, PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (2d ed. 2005). 
15 See SEARLE, supra note 13, at 27-29.   
16 See also Thomas A. Sebeok, The Doctrine of Signs, in FRONTIERS IN SEMIOTICS 35, 36 (John 
Deely, Brooke Williams & Felicia E. Kruse eds., 1986) ("Any source and any destination [of 
signs] is a living entity or the product of a living entity, such as a computer . . . .”).   
17 Again, Peirce tells us that “[a] sign, or representamen [i.e., signifier], is something which 
stands to somebody for something in some capacity.”  PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.28.  
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marks are just that—ink upon a page.  Such ink marks take on intentionality when we (as speaker 
or hearer) use and interpret such marks to represent or point beyond themselves. Thus,  Charles 
Sanders Peirce tells us that “the Sign creates something in the Mind of the Interpreter,”18 and 
“nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign.”19  Thus, Eco also tells us that a "sign is not 
only something which stands for something else; it is also something that can and must be 
interpreted."20 I further address interpretation (including whose interpretation controls in certain 
situations) as the article progresses.  I also contrast interpretation and construction in Section 
VII.B.1. below. 
     C. Definition of Semiotics  
 
 Having defined signs, we can now define “semiotics.” Charles Morris provides a useful 
definition: 
Semiotic[s] has for its goal a general theory of signs in all their forms and manifestations, 
whether in animals or men, whether normal or pathological, whether linguistic or 
nonlinguistic, whether personal or social.  Semiotic is thus an interdisciplinary 
enterprise.21 
 
                                                 
18 7 & 8 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 8.179 
(Arthur W. Burks ed., 1979). 
19 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.306.  We can thus use intentionality to parse between signifiers and 
non-signifiers.  For example, an unobserved tree may have a patch of bark that cracks in the form 
of “π.”  That crack in the bark is not a signifier of mathematical pi (or any other pi) unless some 
mind uses or perceives that crack in the bark as signifying pi or as otherwise having such 
mathematical meaning.   I have an express purpose in using "mind" here rather than "person" 
when referring to such intentionality.  Although beyond the scope of this article, I am 
sympathetic with the field of zoosemiotics, which explores animals and semiotics.  See Sebeok, 
supra note 16, at 76 (Zoosemiotics "focuses on messages given off and received by animals, 
including important components of human nonverbal communication, but excluding Nan's 
language and is secondary, language-derived semiotic systems, such as sign language or Morse 
code.”). 
20 ECO, supra note 9, at 46. 
21 MORRIS, supra note 4, at 1. 
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Although Morris uses the term "semiotic,” I follow Sebeok and use the term "semiotics," which 
Sebeok notes has "made irreversible inroads over" the term "semiotic" in American English.22  
 As a general and interdisciplinary theory of signs which covers how we signify and how 
we interpret experience, semiotics is thus a vast enterprise. As Sebeok tells us, "what semiotics is 
finally all about is the role of the mind in the creation of the world or of physical constructs out 
of a vast and diverse crush of sense impressions."23  Good lawyers can hardly fail to have a good 
grasp of such an enterprise. 
III. Structure and Concomitants of Signs in More Detail 
 With the above preliminaries addressed, we can now turn in more detail to the structure 
of signs.  In what follows, I shall use Eco’s description above of a sign as "a correlation between 
a signifier and a signified (or between expression and content) and therefore as an action 
between pairs." 24 As such, I shall distinguish and explore the signifier and the signified as 
correlated in the sign. 
 A. The Signifier 
 When lawyers think of signifiers, they often think of either written text (as with the 
Justice Scalia example above) or spoken words (as, for example, in a jury instruction).  One of 
the goals of this article is to expand lawyers' views of the vast expanse of possible signifiers 
beyond text and spoken words.  I will give a concrete example of the importance of such 
expansion in Section V. B below, where I briefly explore as an exemplar for lawyers Marc 
Antony’s use of multiple types of signifiers.  In performing such expiration, I hope lawyers will 
                                                 
22 Thomas A. Sebeok, ‘Semiotics’ and Its Congeners, in 1 LINGUISTIC AND LITERARY STUDIES 
283, 288 (Mohammad Ali Jazayery, Edgar C. Polomé & Werner Winter eds., Mouton Publishers 
1978).  
23 Sebeok, supra note 16, at 42. 
24 ECO, supra note 9, at 1. 
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take to heart Langer’s assertion that "[l]anguage is by no means our only articulate product."25 
When analyzing signifiers, we must remember that they can include such a wide array as a 
“concrete object,” “an abstract entity,” “an idea or ‘thought,’” a “perceptible object,” a “physical 
event,” or an “imaginable object.26  I explore signifier types further in Section IV, where I 
explore the indexical, iconic, and symbolic signifier types that lawyers and others can encounter 
and use. 
 B. The Signified  
 Since the same person, place, thing, or event can have multiple meanings (my nephew is 
also my brother’s son), the signified can involve both sense (the cognitive or mental component 
of meaning) and reference (that to which the term refers as fact such as the earth revolving 
around the sun or fiction such as Pegasus flying around the earth).27  Meaning has a sense 
component to account for the different meanings (such as nephew or son) the same person, place, 
or thing may have.  Meaning has a reference component to tie meaning to the specific portions of 
the objective or fictional world of experience and to tie together the different senses those 
specific portions may have.28  Thus, for example, reference ties “my nephew” and “my brother’s 
son” into the same person.  Careful lawyers will grasp both suitable referential aspects of 
meaning in play as well as suitable sense. 
 
                                                 
25 Susanne K. Langer, Discursive and Presentational Forms, in SEMIOTICS: AN INTRODUCTORY 
ANTHOLOGY 87, 96 (Robert E. Innis ed., 1985).  
26 See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 80. See also PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.230 (failing to parse 
between “sign” and “signifier” in discussing the “perceptible” and the “imaginable”). 
27 See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 92-100. The signified may involve only reference when, for 
example, it refers to the pre-semantic which has not yet been put to words or otherwise given 
sense.  See Harold A. Lloyd, Making Good Sense: Pragmatism’s Mastery of Meaning, Truth, 
and Workable Rule of Law, 9:2 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 199, 208-09 (2019). 
28 See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 92-100. 
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  1. Reference and the Referent 
   a. Definition of Referent 
 The referent is thus that to which a signifier refers as fact or fiction.29  Again, for 
example, it is the single person referred to by both “my nephew” and “my brother’s son.” 
 Lawyers should remember that when we meaningfully refer with our signifiers, we are 
referring within the context of experience as we have interpreted it in our webs of signs (unless 
we would refer without more to the yet uninterpreted).30  When referring within such interpreted 
experience, we are thus not referring to unknown or transcendentally-fixed things-in-themselves.  
Instead, we are referring to “things” within our semantic lifeworlds31 woven out of our webs of 
signs.  Since we weave our webs of signs, such webs of signs and the “things” within them are 
not transcendentally given and we can thus revise our referents to the extent pre-semantic and 
semantic restraints allow.32 
 Lawyers should remember this critical nature of reference because it permits progress. 
Since referents are not transcendentally given, and since reality is “internal” to our semantic 
lifeworlds,33 we can always have hope of changing them where progress requires.  Thus, for 
example, since the referent of marriage is not transcendentally fixed, we can point out its referent 
                                                 
29 Reference, PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (2d ed. 2005). 
30 Lloyd, supra note 27, at 208-09.  
31 See Appendix for a brief outline of the term “lifeworld” and related terms. 
32 Lloyd, supra note 27, at 206-10, 222-44, 264-74 where I discuss in detail the freedoms and 
restraints on change. 
33 See id. See also HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE 114 (James Conant ed., 
1992) (the internal realist “is willing to think of reference as internal to ‘texts’ (or theories), 
provided we recognize that there are better and worse ‘texts.’  ‘Better’ and ‘worse’ may 
themselves depend on our historical situation and our purposes; there is no notion of a God's-Eye 
View of Truth here . . . . ”). 
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with definite descriptions34 that do not limit the referent to heterosexual unions (much like we 
can point out the referent of earth with definite descriptions that do not involve older descriptions 
such as the flat surface at the center of the universe).35  As I have written elsewhere, re-
describing commonly-accepted aspects of lifeworlds can face considerable pushback, but 
lawyers have a duty to resist such pushback where moral or other experience (or both) require.36 
The same duty applies to the "sense" component of meaning discussed in more detail below. 
   b. Reference Difficulties for Lawyers and Others 
 Forgetting that references are not transcendentally fixed is thus a first-order error of 
reference. Where references in our semantic lifeworld are wrong, forgetting that they are at most 
“mind-forged manacles”37  that we might break is a tragedy of the highest order for lawyers and 
their clients.  
 A second-order error of reference stems from the act of referring itself.  When a client 
would refer to something whose ownership she disputes with her sibling (such as a diamond 
money clip to which she points), problems can arise from the mechanics of reference itself.  
                                                 
34 By “definite descriptions,” I mean a “description of a (putative) object as the single, unique, 
bearer of a property: ‘the smallest positive number’; ‘the first dog born at sea’; ‘the richest 
person in the world.’”  Definite Description, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (3d ed. 2016). 
35 Philosophers do not agree on how reference works.  See Referring, THE OXFORD COMPANION 
TO PHILOSOPHY (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005).  (“Intuitively, for an expression to refer is for 
it to stand for or pick out something, but what this involves has long been debated.  According to 
Frege the reference of an expression is determined by its sense, but lately Kaplan and Kripke 
have argued that some terms such as demonstratives, proper names, and natural-kind terms, refer 
directly.”)  Lawyers do not have the luxury of debate here and must make reference work in their 
discussions with clients and others.   Proper names where applicable “like ‘Julius Caesar’ or 
definite descriptions like ‘the conqueror of Gaul’” seem to me sounder ways to start.  See 
Reference, PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (2d ed. 2005).   
36 See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 27, at 264-74 (discussing “workability” to avoid pre-semantic and 
semantic pushback). 
37 See WILLIAM BLAKE, London, in SONGS OF INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE WITH OTHER POEMS 
65, 65 (Basil Montagu Pickering 1866).  
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From the outset, lawyers should know that mere pointing alone never works as a clear act of 
reference.  What is the scope of the reference indicated by the pointing?  As Wittgenstein notes 
for example, when one wishes to name a person by pointing at the person, the viewer might take 
that definition as one of “. . . a color, of a race, or even of a point of the compass.”38  
 In the hypothetical above, perhaps the client is only pointing to one of the diamonds in 
the money clip rather than to the money clip itself.  Perhaps the sibling does not care about that 
diamond and would be satisfied with the rest of the money clip.  The lawyer would be well-
advised here to inquire in more depth as to the client’s reference.  Otherwise the parties may 
have an unnecessary lawsuit.   
 Reference can also be further complicated here by imprecision on the client’s part.  The 
client may actually point to the entire money clip though she only really wants the diamond.  The 
client may even initially use the phrase “money clip” even though she only wants the diamond 
and has no desire to keep the rest of the money clip.  Her lawyer must thus not only seek 
precision as to her expressed reference but also seek clarity as to her real reference.  As I have 
discussed the need for careful reference in detail elsewhere,39  I will not discuss the matter 
further here. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 LUDWIG WITTGENEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 13-14 (G. E. M. Anscombe et al. 
trans., Macmillan Co. 3d ed. 1968). 
39 Harold A. Lloyd, Plane Meaning and Thought: Real-World Semantics and Factions of 
Originalism, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 657, 680-83 (2015).  
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  2. Sense 
   a. Overview  
 With the understanding that “experience”  includes external experience (i.e., public or 
objective experience) as well as internal experience (i.e., private40 experience such as thoughts, 
imagination, memories, and feelings41), in defining “sense” I shall use the following modified 
version of Charles Sanders Peirce’s early pragmatic notion of meaning: the sense of a particular 
concept is the total actual and possibly-conceivable42 ways in which that concept unfolds or can 
unfold in such experience.43 Thus, for example, the different senses of “President of the Senate” 
and “Vice President” (both of which refer to the same person) depend upon the different ways 
such notions play out in such experience.44 
 I choose this approach to sense for at least two reasons.  First, if sense does not come 
through either external experience (i.e., public or objective experience) or through internal 
                                                 
40 By private experience, I mean experience private to the individual such as (without limitation) 
a thought or pleasant or painful sensation. 
41 This is thus broader than "synthesis, imagination, memory, evaluation and estimation" which 
Deely calls the "internal sense in philosophical tradition."  JOHN DEELY, INTRODUCING 
SEMIOTIC: ITS HISTORY AND DOCTRINE 98 (1982). 
42 Again, this can include private experience.  “Possible” incorporates a normative as well as 
factual sense.  For example, it is not possible in common speech for a typical dog to have ten 
legs.  
43 Peirce’s formula reads: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.  Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”  PEIRCE, supra note 6, at 5.402. To the 
extent Peirce’s formula focuses only on objective experience and therefore results in beliefs 
being synonymous if they cause the same habits, I would disagree.  See JOHN P. MURPHY, 
PRAGMATISM: FROM PEIRCE TO DAVIDSON 25-26 (1990).  For example, after hearing a knock, I 
could have a habit of walking across my office to the door in just the same way whether I believe 
that a student or another professor is at the door.  See also WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 18 
(Thomas Crofts & Philip Smith eds., Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1995) (1907) (setting out James’s 
interpretation of Peirce’s notion of meaning). 
44 Such experience can include connotation, or the "socio-cultural and personal associations,” 
attached to the signifier or the signified.  See ROBERT CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS 246 
(2nd ed. 2007). 
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experience (i.e., private experience such as thoughts, imagination, memories, and feelings), how 
could we possibly know it or relate it to the world of our external or internal experience?  
Second, and consistent with the first reason, this notion of sense fits how we understand sense in 
court, in the practice of law, in law school, and in life.  If one asks good lawyers, for example, 
what an actual or proposed liability limitation in a contract means, such lawyers would “flesh it 
out” and would describe how the liability limitation would play out in practice.  These reasons 
are compelling in themselves, and I will therefore not explore in this article difficulties with 
other current accounts of meaning and sense that I have discussed elsewhere (such as meaning as 
reference alone, meaning as merely ideas, behaviorism, and meaning as truth conditions.)45 
 Consistent with the experiential definition I have used of "sense," the signified may, 
however, be much less complex than how a proposed liability limitation in a contract might play 
                                                 
45 Harold A. Lloyd, Exercising Common Sense, Exorcising Langdell: The Inseparability of Legal 
Theory, Practice and the Humanities, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1213, 1250-1254 (2014).  
Additionally, C.K. Ogden & I.A. Richards outline no less than sixteen broad approaches to 
meaning (with some approaches having various subdivisions).  In this outline, meaning can be:  
“I An Intrinsic property.  II A unique unanalyzable Relation to other things.  III The other words 
annexed to a word in the Dictionary.  IV The Connotation of a word.  V An Essence.  VI An 
activity Projected into an object.  VII (a) An event intended. (b) A Volition.  VIII The Place of 
anything in a system.  IX The practical Consequences of a thing in our future experience.  [This 
comes closest to my definition, although I would include past experience and am careful to 
include both external and internal experience as above defined.]  X The Theoretical 
consequences involved in or implied by a statement.  XI Emotion aroused by anything.  XII That 
which is Actually related to a sign by a chosen relation.  XIII (a) The Mnemic effects of a 
stimulus. Associations required. (b) Some other occurrence to which the mnemic effects of any 
occurrence are Appropriate. (c) That which a sign is Interpreted as being of. (d) What anything 
Suggests.  In the case of symbols.  That to which the User of a Symbol actually refers.  XIV That 
to which the user of a symbol Ought to be referring.  XV That to which the user of a symbol 
Believes himself to be referring.  XVI That to which the Interpreter of a symbol (a) Refers.(b) 
Believes himself to be referring. (c) Believes the User to be referring.”  C.K. OGDEN & I.A. 
RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 186-87 (1923).  If we are to know any such meaning, I 
would simply ask how such meaning, could be separated from “experience” as I have defined it. 
Such a return to experience as I have defined it, of course, returns us to my proposed definitions 
of meaning and sense. 
 16 
 
out in experience. In some cases, the signified might simply be a feeling (or at least at first just a 
feeling).  Peirce, for example, tells us that "the first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling 
produced by it. There is almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we 
comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently 
very slight."46 
 Signs can also produce a feeling that something is not right. For example, the word 
"slave" might invoke to Huck Finn a certain extreme malaise that he cannot put into words in his 
current vocabulary.  As I have argued elsewhere, such feeling can play an important role in our 
interactions with the world, as with Huck’s decision to help liberate a slave even though his 
concepts and categories of the time told him that was wrong.47 Lawyers, too, should of course 
listen to their feelings when, for example, a proposed text or course of action does not feel right. 
 The signified can be feelings of other kinds as well. For example, Peirce believes that 
"the performance of a piece of concerted music is a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey, 
the composer’s musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings."48   
 Thus, when I refer to "experience," I refer along with Deely to "the whole of our 
experience, from its most primitive origins in sensation to its most refined achievements of 
understanding" and thus to a “network or web of sign relations.”49  I also agree with Deely that 
"experience reveals itself as a constructed network built over time both through [our] biological 
                                                 
46 PEIRCE, supra note 6, at 5.475. 
47 See Harold A. Lloyd, Cognitive Emotion and the Law, 41 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 62-63 
(2016); Lloyd, supra note 27, at 225-26. 
48 PEIRCE, supra note 6, at 5.475. 
49 JOHN DEELY, BASICS OF SEMIOTICS 13 (2004). 
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heritage . . . and through the individual experiences whereby, atop the biological heritage, 
socialization and enculturation transpire."50 
 Finally, lawyers should remember that sense, like reference, is not transcendentally 
fixed.51 We can and should adjust our sense as moral or other experience (or both) demands.  For 
example, where moral and other experience (or both) require correction of the dehumanizing of 
homosexuals, lawyers should work against such dehumanization.  No matter how old the 
pedigree of such dehumanization, such dehumanization is not transcendentally fixed52 and can 
therefore be combatted and corrected no less than notions, again, that once held that the earth is 
flat and in the center of the universe.  Once more, however, lawyers must be aware of the strong 
pushback that may occur when commonly-held meanings and categorizations are challenged in 
lifeworlds and strategize accordingly.53 
   b. Sense and “Dimensions of Signification”  
 With Morris, we can also usefully note a further expansive nature of sense, distinguishing 
between three "dimensions" of signification: the designative, appraisive, and prescriptive.54  
Morris thus tells us that the “designative” involves the "Sense organs" and relates to "Obtaining 
information," the “appraisive” involves "Object preferences" and relates to the "Selection of 
objects for preferential behavior," and the “prescriptive” involves "Behavior preferences" and 
relates to "Action on object by specific behavior."55  As examples, he tells us that "usually 
‘black’ is primarily descriptive,’ good’ is primarily appraisive, and ‘ought’ is primarily 
                                                 
50 Id. at 14. 
51 See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 210-22. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 227-43. 
54 MORRIS, supra note 4, at 4. 
55 Id. at 8.  
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prescriptive."56  Morris notes that context can change this result, and in some contexts, "black" 
can be “primarily appraisive or prescriptive,” "good" can be primarily “designative or 
prescriptive,” and “ought” can be "primarily designative or appraisive.”57  Morris also notes that 
any particular sign "may in varying degrees operate in all the dimensions of signification.”58  
Again, therefore, sense may involve more than just communication of fact or fiction.  Rather 
than simply listening to a client’s words, a lawyer should, of course, probe the way the client 
describes and perceives the matter at hand, the way the client appraises the matter at hand, and 
the way the client would prefer to act.  It is hard to see how a lawyer can discern a client's real 
interests in a matter without exploring Morris's three dimensions of signification.  In this regard, 
one can consider again the diamond money clip dispute discussed in Section III. B. 1. b. above. 
  3. Reference, Sense, and RIRAC:  Polishing One Legal Form of Thought 
 We can also use the sense and reference dimensions of meaning to polish a common legal 
form of thought: IRAC.  In teaching law students to address all necessary steps in legal analysis, 
we teach them, among other things, the IRAC form, which stands for "Issue," "Rule," 
"Application," and "Conclusion."59  Using IRAC as both a form and as a checklist, students and 
lawyers can both improve the logical flow of their analysis and check for omissions in their 
analysis. As to logical flow, resolving legal issues requires finding the rules that govern such 
issues, applying such rules, and reaching a conclusion.  As to IRAC as a checklist, it reminds 
students and lawyers to identify and explore fully the issue or issues in play, to fully research and 
explore the rules in play, to fully and expressly apply those rules in play (a step that requires 
                                                 
56 Id. at 4-5.  
57 Id. at 5.  
58 Id.  
59 COUGHLIN ET AL., A LAWYER WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS 94 (3d ed. 
2018).  
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constant reminder given the tendency to assume readers also know all the application steps that 
are in the student's or lawyer's head), and to provide the appropriate conclusion in a way that 
makes sense to the reader. 
 IRAC is thus quite useful as far as it goes.  However, its focus on issues, rules, 
applications, and conclusions is a focus on the sense aspect of meaning. As we have seen that 
meaning involves both reference and sense, IRAC safely works only where there is no dispute or 
confusion as to reference.  As we saw with the diamond money clip above, assuming no dispute 
or confusion as to reference can be quite dangerous.  I therefore teach students that they should 
remember, in actual law practice at least, the more expansive checklist of RIRAC, with the first 
"R" standing for "reference." I, in fact, encourage them to think of RIRAC as one of the most 
basic forms (if not the most basic form) of checklists, as it is applicable across a wide variety of 
legal situations.  For example, when a client arrives to discuss a dispute (such as a dispute 
involving the money clip above), the lawyer's first step should be to clarify the reference.  If the 
lawyer, client, or opposing party is confused about the reference, then the issues, rules, 
applications, and conclusions debated and explored may be irrelevant to the real matter in 
dispute.  As shown by the diamond money clip dispute above, finding such reference can be 
difficult, but it must be done.  Lawyers must have a complete and accurate grasp of the signified, 
which includes reference as well as sense.  Since I have also addressed RIRAC in detail 
elsewhere,60 I will not explore it further here.   
IV. Correlation of Signifier and Signified and Three Classifications of Signs  
 Having explored both the signifier and the signified, we can now explore their 
correlation. This, which should help demonstrate to lawyers the vast expanse of signs available 
                                                 
60 Lloyd, supra note 39, at 669-70. 
 20 
 
for their use. In what follows, I shall again use Eco’s description above of a sign as "a correlation 
between a signifier and a signified (or between expression and content) and therefore as an 
action between pairs." 61 Peirce gives us three basic types of correlation (the indexical, the 
iconic, and the symbolic62) that are of special interest to lawyers, and I thus briefly explore below 
the signifier-signified co-relations in indices, icons, and symbols.63  Since lawyers tend to focus 
on text and speech (which use symbolic forms of signifiers), I will begin with Peirce’s perhaps 
less familiar types of signs involving indexical and iconic signifiers. 
 A. Indices 
  1. Correlation of “Real” Relation 
 Peirce tells us that "[a]n Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue 
of being really affected by that Object,"64 or "by virtue of being in a real relation to it."65  
Chandler usefully expands upon the indexical relation as "a mode in which the signifier is not 
arbitrary but is directly connected in some way (physically or causally) to the signified 
(regardless of intention)."66 
 Peirce gives a number of examples of indices including, the following: a sundial 
indicating the time, a "rap on the door," "a tremendous thunderbolt [indicating] that something 
considerable happened," "a low barometer with a moist air” indicating rain, a "weather cock" 
                                                 
61 ECO, supra note 9, at 1. 
62 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.275; PEIRCE, supra note 18, at 8.335. See also generally PEIRCE, 
supra note 7, at 2.247-49, 2.275-307.  
63 I agree with Chandler that "although [this tripartite division of signs] is often referred to as a 
classification of distinct ‘types of signs,’ it is more usefully interpreted in terms of differing 
‘modes of relationship’ between [signifiers] and what is signified." CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 
36. 
64 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.248. 
65 See PEIRCE, supra note 18, at 8.335. Peirce uses the term “dynamic object” here. 
66 CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 37.  
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indicating the direction of the wind, "the pole star” indicating north like a "pointing finger," a 
"plumb bob" indicating the "vertical direction," demonstrative pronouns like "this" and "that" 
indicating when successfully calling "upon the hearer to use his powers of observation [in order 
to] establish a real connection between his mind and the object," letters such as “A, B, C, D” 
used by geometricians to indicate parts of diagrams or used by lawyers and others to "fulfill the 
office of relative pronouns."67 Thus, Peirce also tells us that pronouns are indices because "they 
indicate things in the directest possible way."68 Thus, "a pronoun ought to be defined as a word 
which may indicate anything to which the first and second persons have suitable real 
connections, by calling the attention of the second person to it."69  Similarly, indices can also be 
"more or less detailed directions for what the hearer is to do in order to place himself in direct 
experiential or other connection with the thing meant."70  This could include such notices as 
"there is a rock, or shoal, or buoy, or lightship."71  Peirce also both claims that proper names are 
indices72 and that proper names "should probably be regarded as Indices.”73  Short explains 
Peirce’s likely thinking here as follows: "we can say that each replica of the same proper name, 
e.g., ‘Napoleon Bonaparte,’ signifies whatever earlier replicas signified, going back to its 
                                                 
67 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.285-87.  
68 Id. at 2.287 n.1.   
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 2.288. 
71 Id. 
72 See PEIRCE, supra note 18, at 8.335.  
73 3 & 4 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 4.544 
(Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1980).  As an example of the difficulties of parsing out 
Peirce’s actual thought, he also tells us that "a proper name, personal demonstrative, or relative 
pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does knowing to a real connection 
with its object but none of these is and Index, since it is not an individual."73  PEIRCE, supra note 
7, at 2.284. Again, my purpose here is to provide an overview of semiotics that I believe works 
and is useful to lawyers; I am not trying to provide an encyclopedic survey of conflicting views 
between various thinkers and within individual thinkers themselves. 
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original replicas, assigned, by an act of naming . . . ."74  Finally, Peirce notes the role of indices 
in successful communication.  The claim "Why, it is raining!" does not tell us where it is raining; 
we need either context (such as the speaker's "standing here looking out at a window as he 
speaks, which would serve as an Index"), or we need the proposition itself to indicate where it is 
raining.75 
 Noting that the link between signifier and signified "can be observed or inferred,” as 
examples of indices, he lists:  
‘natural signs’ (smoke, thunder, footprints, echoes, non-synthetic odours and flavours), 
medical symptoms (pain, a rash, pulse-rate), measuring instruments (weathercock, 
thermometer, clock, spirit-level, ‘signals’ (a knock on the door, a phone ringing), pointers 
(a pointing ‘index’ finger, a directional signpost), recordings (a photograph, a film, video 
or television shot, and audio-recorded voice), [and] personal ‘trademarks’ (handwriting, 
catchphrases).76 
 
 I could, of course, explore in virtually endless detail Peirce’s other complex comments on 
indices (some of which I would challenge). However, my purpose here is to explore semiotics in 
a form useful to lawyers, and this enumeration of indices should suffice for the notion that 
indexical relations occur where “the signifier is not arbitrary but is directly connected in some 
way (physically or causally) to the signified (regardless of intention)." 77  
  2. Evidence and Indices 
 Many lawyers will no doubt quickly think of evidence when they consider such a notion 
of the indexical sign.  A bloody knife, for example, can be an indexical sign of a stabbing if the 
knife is directly connected to that stabbing in the way that indexical co-relations require.  Rather 
                                                 
74 T. L. Short, Life Among the Legisigns, in FRONTIERS IN SEMIOTICS 105, 112 (John Deely, 
Brooke Williams & Felicia E. Kruse eds., 1986). 
75 See PEIRCE, supra note 73, at 4.544. 
76 CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 37. 
77 Id. 
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than a mere academic exercise, understanding the nature and proof of such indexical co-relations 
is thus of critical importance to lawyers.  An indexical bloody knife also reminds the lawyer of 
the potential power of indexicals over words in such cases.  A bloody knife directly connected 
with both a stabbing and the person alleged to have committed the stabbing can be much more 
rhetorically compelling than the victim's words, especially if the stabber disputes the victim's 
words.  I will return to indices in Section V. B. below, when I explore the rhetorical indexical 
force of Caesar’s body, bloody toga, and will in Marc Antony’s funeral oration for Caesar, and in 
Section IX, when I explore certain indexical claims in the context of the First Amendment. 
 B. Icons  
  1. Correlation of Similarity 
 Peirce tells us that an icon represents “mainly by its similarity.”78  Chandler usefully 
clarifies the co-relation of signifier and signified here as “a mode in which the signifier is 
perceived as resembling or imitating the signified (recognizably looking, sounding, feeling, 
tasting or smelling like it) [or] being similar in possessing some of its qualities.”79 
 For Peirce, icons include, without limitation, images, diagrams, pictures, and 
metaphors.80  Peirce also notes that although photographs "are in certain respects exactly like the 
objects they represent," they obtain this likeness through the physical connections of 
photography.  As such, photographs are indices.81  (In my view, photographs are both indices 
and icons and demonstrate how signifiers and their signified can have multiple co-relations.)   
                                                 
78 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.276. 
79 CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 36. 
80 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.277, 2.279. 
81 Id. at 2.281. 
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 Peirce points out that resemblance need not turn on appearance.  It can also involve 
resemblance of objects in terms of "the relations of their parts."82  Diagrams, for example, may 
set out certain parts of their objects without truly resembling them.83  
 Lawyers may, at first blush, consider icons less useful than indices, because the latter 
have “real” relations to what they signify.  For example, a clear photograph of an alleged 
criminal stabbing a victim is certainly more persuasive of guilt than a clear drawing of the same 
act.  This initial thought, however, underestimates the value of icons in practice.  First, icons can 
focus only on relevant relations as in the case of diagrams.84  As such, they permit us to study 
and discover new knowledge from depictions of such relations.85  By excluding irrelevant 
aspects of matters diagrammed, they can perhaps expedite such discovery.  By excluding such 
irrelevant aspects of matters diagrammed, diagrams can also perhaps expedite uncovering error 
or other difficulties in the matters diagrammed.  Second, since icons are untethered from the 
"real" relations found in photography, for example, they allow rhetorical use not possible with 
indices such as photographs.86 Cartoons, for example, can powerfully depict points of views by 
the manner in which they portray the persons, places, things, or other matters.   
 Lawyers should also remember that the iconic signification can be all the more powerful 
or memorable by focusing on unexpected points of resemblance.  For example, Oscar Wilde 
                                                 
82 Id. at 2.282. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See id. at 2.279. 
86 One can, of course, untether photographs by “touching them up” or by otherwise altering 
them.  However, to the extent this breaks the "real" relation with the matters depicted, the 
photographs by definition no longer remain indexical. 
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famously refers to a person with a “shrill horrid voice” as “a peacock in everything but 
beauty.”87 
 In addition to their imitative aspects, icons interrelate with the non-imitative in ways that 
lawyers should also understand if they are to effectively use and respond to iconic signifiers.  
  2. Functions of Background 
 As Schapiro points out, icons such as images or paintings generally appear against the 
background, a background which we often assume today to be rectangular and having a "clearly 
defined smooth surface on which one draws and writes."88  Of course, such a background is not 
compelled, and lawyers seeking the most effective form of, for example, iconic exhibits should 
consider whether other background shapes and textures would be preferable in the lawyers' 
specific situation.89  We can go even further and ask whether we want a clear distinction between 
background and image.  In this regard, Schapiro reminds us that "prehistoric wall paintings and 
                                                 
87 OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 10 (Michael Patrick Gillespie ed., W. W. 
Norton & Co. 2007) (1890). Jakobson gives us another striking example: “A missionary blamed 
his African flock for walking around undressed. ‘And what about yourself?’ they pointed to his 
visage, ‘are you, too, somewhere naked?’ ‘Well, but that is my face.’ ‘Yet in us,’ retorted the 
natives, ‘everywhere it is face.’” Roman Jakobson, Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics, 
in SEMIOTICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANTHOLOGY 145, 173 (Robert E. Innis ed., 1985). 
88 Meyer Schapiro, On Some Problems in the Semiotics of the Visual Arts: Field and Vehicle in 
Image-Signs, in SEMIOTICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANTHOLOGY 206, 209 (Robert E. Innis ed., 
1985). 
89 Thus, Schapiro tells us of those who "have painted on pebbles and on found fragments of 
natural and artificial objects, exploiting the irregularities of the ground in the physiognomy me of 
the object as part of the charm of the whole."  Id. at 211.  Schapiro also reminds us that ancient 
cave paintings were on "the rough wall of the cave" where "the irregularities of earth and rock 
show through the image," and the painter worked "on a field with no set boundaries and thought 
so little of the surface as a distinct ground that he often painted his animal figure over previously 
painted image without erasing the latter, as if it were invisible to the viewer."  Id. at 209. 
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reliefs . . . had to compete with the noise-like accidents and irregularities of a ground which was 
no less articulated than the signed and could intrude upon it."90 
  3. Functions of Physical Frames 
 As Schapiro also points out, iconic images may or may not have physical frames.91 
Leaving the image unframed may make it appear "more completely and modestly the artist's 
work.”92  Depending on the choice of frame, the frame can help accent the iconic image, can 
serve as a "finding and focusing device," and can act "like a window frame through which is seen 
behind the glass" where the world of the iconic image lies.93 
  4. Functions of Size 
 Additionally, size plays a role in how we perceive the iconic image. Our reaction may 
change as a function of "the size of the field and the size of different components of the image 
relative to real objects which they signify and relative to each other."94 For example, one might 
paint Alexander the Great as larger than his soldiers to reflect the notion of "Alexander as the 
Great."95 
  5. Functions of Place 
 Where we have a bounded visual field, iconic images can change in quality depending 
upon their location within various parts of the field, such as "upper and lower, left and right, 
central and peripheral, the corners and the rest of the space."96 For example, a figure off-center 
                                                 
90 Schapiro, supra note 88, at 209.  
91 Id. at 212-13. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 212. 
94 Id. at 219. 
95 Id. at 221. 
96 Id. at 214. 
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can appear "anomalous, displaced, even spiritually strained."97  All of these non-imitative aspects 
of iconic images can thus play important roles in lawyers' use of, and response to, iconic 
signifiers. 
  6. Icons, Art, and Knowledge 
 In any case, the semiotic possibilities of the icon discussed above should persuade 
lawyers of the value and importance of icons.  Hopefully this includes lawyers who previously 
may have dismissed icons’ importance because of a more general belief that art is merely "some 
alien universe into which we are magically transported for a time."98  Because icons signify, we 
lawyers, too, can say that art can be “knowledge,” and in such a case, “experiencing an artwork 
means sharing in that knowledge."99  I will return to icons in Section V below, when I discuss the 
power of mixing icons, indices, and symbols. 
 C. Symbols   
  1. Correlation of Convention or Stipulation 
 Taking inspiration again from Peirce, symbols are signs whose signifier and signified are 
correlated solely100 by convention or by habit,101 or otherwise "by the fact that [they are] used 
and understood as such."102 Symbols would thus include “words, sentences, books, and other 
conventional signs."103  Chandler again usefully expands upon Peirce by noting that the symbolic 
mode is "a mode in which the signifier does not resemble the signified but which is 
                                                 
97 Id.  
98 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD 83 (rev. ed. 2004). 
99 Id. at 84.  
100 See PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.299 ("The symbol is connected with its object by virtue of the 
idea of the symbol-using mind, without which no such connection would exist."). 
101 See id. at 2.292, 2.297. 
102 See id. at 2.307. 
103 Id. at 2.292. 
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fundamentally arbitrary or purely conventional so that this relationship must be agreed upon and 
learned."104  Chandler would thus expand upon the above list of symbols to include, for example, 
"language in general (plus specific languages, alphabetical letters, punctuation marks, words, 
phrases and sentences), numbers, morse [sic] code, traffic lights, [and] national flags."105 
  2. Symbolic Signifiers : Freedom Yet Restraint 
 Any “concrete object,” “abstract entity,” “idea or ‘thought,’” perceptible object,” 
“physical event,” or “imaginable object106 might serve as a symbolic signifier either by 
convention or by stipulation.107  If it is convenient, for example, for parties in a debate to use a 
white stone to refer to one proposition and a gray stone to refer to another, there is no semiotic 
reason why the parties cannot so stipulate. This potential flexibility thus presents lawyers with 
vast potential options 
 That said, however, such theoretical freedom can face much real world pushback. 
Unconventional signifier usage, for example, that violates linguistic community norms or that 
otherwise fails to move audiences in ways desired will on its face fall flat.  Lawyers must 
remember that their surrounding linguistic communities require justification when signifier usage 
deviates from norms.108 
 Such potential flexibility of symbolic signifiers can also raise other potential legal issues.  
For example, since any “concrete object,” “abstract entity,” “idea or ‘thought,’” perceptible 
                                                 
104 CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 36. 
105 Id. 
106 See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 80.  See also PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.230 (failing to parse 
between “sign” and “signifier” in discussing the “perceptible” and the “imaginable”). 
107 To the extent any such symbols indicate a speaker’s meaning by being in a causal or other 
real connection with such meaning, we could also speak of such symbols of indices of such 
meaning.  See Section IV. A. above on indices. 
108 See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 227-28. 
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object,” “physical event,” or “imaginable object109 can potentially serve as a symbolic signifier, 
can everything potentially become protected speech or expression under the First Amendment to 
the extent one claims signifier usage in such a case?   Obviously, there must be limits here (for 
example, no reasonable person would find the First Amendment protects tossing live grenades as 
signifiers of political dissatisfaction), and I briefly touch on semiotics and the First Amendment 
in Section IX.    
 D. Correlation and the Transubstantiation Fallacy 
 When exploring the correlation of signifier and signified, lawyers must take care 
themselves (as well as help their clients to take such care where appropriate) not to confuse a 
signifier with its signified.  Such confusion, which one might call the “transubstantiation 
fallacy,” can cause much unnecessary confusion and angst.   
 For example, the flag for many signifies one’s country.  However, the flag itself, of 
course, is not one’s country.  Thus, trampling the flag is not trampling one’s country or otherwise 
physically harming one’s country (though such action may signify extreme disrespect for one’s 
country).  When addressing such passionate subjects110 as protests involving damage to national 
flags, rational discourse thus focuses on flags as signifiers rather than as nations 
transubstantiated.  Similarly, burning a picture of a beloved person to send a message about that 
person is not equivalent to burning that person, and, again, rational discourse should focus on 
burning photos as signifiers rather than as persons transubstantiated.  In a different manifestation 
of the transubstantiation fallacy, using icons as signifiers of divine or religious figures is not 
                                                 
109 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
110 Transubstantiation beliefs seem especially likely to occur when dealing with signifieds of 
high regard.  Thus, for example, we have the transubstantiation debate regarding Christian 
Communion.  See Michael Newsom, Pan-Protestantism and Proselytizing: Minority Religions in 
a Protestant Empire, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 12-50 (2009).  
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idolatry in the sense of equating such iconic signifiers with the divine or religious figures 
signified.  Had Cromwell, for example, grasped the transubstantiation fallacy, perhaps much 
treasured British iconography would have escaped his destruction.111  In any case, awareness of 
the transubstantiation fallacy should expose the confused “anti-idolatrous” iconoclast “who 
destroys religious images”112 used as icons to signify what they resemble. 
 E. Beyond Correlation: Other Classification Possibilities 
 Having now finished an overview of sign classifications based upon three possible 
correlations of the signifier to the signified (the indexical, iconic, and symbolic), I briefly note 
(without exhaustive classification) that we can classify signs by their types of signifiers, by their 
types of signifieds, and by how these types of signifiers and signifieds interrelate.113  Focusing 
just on the type of signifier or signified, we can note that a signifier can include a quality, an 
“actual existent thing or event,” or a conventional signifier such as “the.”114  This is not a mere 
academic exercise but of potential important use to lawyers.  A lawyer considering how to 
signify a person or event should consider which type of signifier in itself would be most 
effective.   
 For example, although a quality must be "embodied"115 (we do not find red in itself but as 
the color of something seen or thought), we can consider which signifiers best signified the 
quality we wish to convey.  A lawyer wishing to signify the horror of a tragedy might first 
assume a photograph conveys that horror.  However, upon further reflection, perhaps a sound 
                                                 
111 ANTONIA FRASER, CROMWELL: THE LORD PROTECTOR 102-04 (1973).  
112 See Iconoclast, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014). 
113 See, e.g., PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.264 (diagramming ten classes).  Peirce expands upon 
these classifications in PIERCE, supra note 18, at 8.343-76. 
114 See PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.244, 2.245, 2.246.  
115 See id. at 2.244. 
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recording better captures the quality of horror.  Perhaps even better still, a film with such sound 
combines both the visual and audial quality of horror lacking in a photograph alone. 
 As to the types of sense signified, they can include terms, propositions, and arguments.116  
Although as lawyers we are often first disposed to our deductive or inductive arguments or 
demonstrations, we should of course also ask whether other approaches might be more effective, 
such as using terms and propositions in narrative or dialogue instead of formal argument.117  
V. Indices, Icons, Symbols, and Expansive Legal Rhetoric 
 A. Lawyers and the Semiotics of Rhetoric: More than Just Words 
 
 As the above discussion of the various types of signs, signifiers, and the signified should 
now make clear, legal rhetoric should hardly be confined to words alone, and a lawyer’s toolbox 
containing only words is much impoverished. Although we refine and use our words, we should 
remember that words are only one type of symbol.  Why not use other symbols as well in 
appropriate contexts to the extent we thereby enrich our meaning?  We should also remember 
that signs are more than just symbols.  Why not use Icons and Indices as well in appropriate 
contexts to the extent we thereby enrich our meaning? Why impoverish law in a semiotics of 
only words?  In the next section, I turn to a bit of Shakespeare to underscore the importance of an 
expansive semiotics.  
 B. Lawyers and the Semiotics of Rhetoric: Antony’s Funeral Oration 
 Once lawyers have a good grasp of how signs work and how signs may be classified by 
correlations of the signifier and the signified, lawyers can find much semiotic instruction in 
                                                 
116 See id. at 2.261, 2.262, 2.263. 
117 Peirce notes that that “our own thinking is carried on as a dialogue” which of course is 
“subject to almost every imperfection of language.”  PEIRCE, supra note 6, at 5.506. 
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Shakespeare’s rendition of Antony’s funeral oration Caesar.118  They can see quite well how 
words alone ignore much of the semiotic arsenal available to them.  Though Antony’s entire 
speech bears reading again and again, space limitations require that I touch on select passages in 
the sequence in which they appear in Shakespeare. (Had I more space, I would also explore other 
classics of expansive semiotics such as (i) the illustrated writings of William Blake which 
demonstrate an unparalleled blending of the iconic and the non-verbal symbolic with the verbal 
symbolic and (ii) Barthes’ exploration of the power of intermingling icons, symbols, colors, 
placement against the background field, and more in his examination of a Panzani 
advertisement.119  I would suggest a careful review of Blake’s illustrated works and Barthes’ 
article for lawyers seeking to improve their rhetoric by grasping the power of mixing semiotics 
beyond words alone.) 
Although we have only the words from the oration, as we will see, the words make plain 
that the oration turns on much more than mere words.  For example, we can begin our selections 
with the following lines that powerfully rely on icons and indices as well as words: 
My heart is in the coffin there with Caesar,                      
And I must pause till it come back to me.120                               
 
Here Antony indexically points to Caesar’s body which is both an index of his murder (being 
physically connected to his murder) and an icon of Caesar (by virtue of resemblance).  The 
                                                 
118 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2 (Penguin Books 2002). 
In addition to the selections examined here, I have examined more of Antony’s speech 
elsewhere.  See Harold A. Lloyd, Let’s Skill All the Lawyers: Shakespearean Lessons in Law and 
Rhetoric, 6 ACTA IURIDICA OLOMUCENSIA 9, 49-55 (2011). 
119 See The William Blake Archive, http://www.blakearchive.org/; Roland Barthes, Rhetoric of 
the Image, in SEMIOTICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANTHOLOGY 190, 192-205 (Robert E. Innis ed., 
1985). I hope to do a separate article on William Blake’s lessons for lawyers including Blake’s 
semiotic insights. 
120 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2, lines 106-07 (Penguin 
Books 2002).  
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metaphor of Antony’s heart briefly sharing Caesar’s coffin paints a powerful picture, a powerful 
icon of grief. 
 As with use of Caesar’s body as a signifier above, Antony continues demonstrating 
adeptness at using the same signifiers for multiple functions.  He invokes Caesar’s will as both 
an index and symbol of Caesar’s love of the Roman people.  It is an index to the extent it is 
directly related to and flowing from Caesar’s affection. It is a symbol to the extent it stands for 
Caesar’s love. Antony also mixes in other signifiers: the “sacred blood” as index of the crime 
and both index and symbol of the “sacred” man, and hair as both index and symbol of the man. 
Thus, Antony speaks in a suspense-building way by calling attention to the will and first feigning 
not to read it: 
But here's a parchment with the seal of Caesar;                   
I found it in his closet. 'Tis his will.                          
Let but the commons hear this testament—                        
Which, pardon me, I do not mean to read—                       
And they would go and kiss dead Caesar's wounds,                   
And dip their napkins in his sacred blood,                        
Yea, beg a hair of him for memory . . . .121                                            
 
 Antony also knows the power of centering icons in the field of vision (which power of 
centering is discussed in Section IV.B.5 above).  To accomplish this with the corpse’s iconic 
power of resemblance to the once living man, Antony thus continues: 
You will compel me then to read the will?                      
Then make a ring about the corpse of Caesar,                       
And let me show you him that made the will.                       
Shall I descend? And will you give me leave?122                            
 
 With the remnants of Caesar and his bloody clothes centered and in closer focus, Antony 
continues mixing his various signs as he examines the body and bloody clothes:  
                                                 
121
 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 128-37. 
122
 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 157-60. See also Section IV.B.5 above on icons and place. 
 34 
 
Look, in this place ran Cassius' dagger through.                
See what a rent the envious Casca made.                           
Through this the well-belovèd Brutus stabbed;                     
And as he plucked his cursèd steel away,                          
Mark how the blood of Caesar followed it,                         
As rushing out of doors, to be resolved                           
If Brutus so unkindly knocked or no-- 
For Brutus, as you know, was Caesar's angel.                      
Judge, O you gods, how dearly Caesar loved him!                   
This was the most unkindest cut of all.123                         
 
In addition to pointing out the indexical evidence of specific conspirators having participated in 
the crime, Antony here also uses the icon of metaphor when he speaks of blood that “followed” 
the stabs of Brutus to determine whether Brutus had in fact “so unkindly knocked.” 
 Noting that Caesar fell “at the base of Pompey’s statue,”124 Antony continues: 
 
O, what a fall was there, my countrymen!                         
Then I, and you, and all of us fell down,                         
Whilst bloody treason flourished over us.                         
O now you weep, and I perceive you feel                          
The dint of pity. These are gracious drops.                       
Kind souls—what--weep you when you but behold                     
Our Caesar's vesture wounded? Look you here. 
Here is himself, marred, as you see, with traitors.125   
 
Here with Caesar’s fall, Antony uses an event as a signifier that he extends metaphorically (and 
thus iconically) to the resulting fall of Antony and the crowd (“all of us fell down”).  And, of 
course, once again Antony points to Caesar’s “marred” body as indicating murder. 
 Powerfully further showing that indices can be compounded as iconic metaphors, Antony  
 
continues:  
 
I tell you that which you yourselves do know,                    
Show you sweet Caesar's wounds, poor poor dumb mouths,126                 
                                                 
123
 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 171-80. 
124
 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 185. 
125 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 187-94. 
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And bid them speak for me. But were I Brutus,                     
And Brutus Antony, there were an Antony                           
Would ruffle up your spirits, and put a tongue                     
In every wound of Caesar that should move                         
The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny.127                                  
 
The wounds again serve here as indices of the murder but now they are also iconically “poor 
dumb mouths” waiting for their tongues to call out mutiny.  This extraordinary metaphor shows 
that Antony (like good lawyers) fully appreciates the power of image over argument in 
appropriate circumstances. 
 Antony returns to the will to make multiple indexical points. The now-disclosed contents 
of the will indicate Caesar’s goodness and love for the Roman people. “Caesar’s seal” indicates 
the authenticity of the will.  Thus, Antony continues: 
Here is the will, and under Caesar's seal.                    
To every Roman citizen he gives--                                
To every several man--seventy-five drachmas . . . . 
Moreover he hath left you all his walks,                     
His private arbors, and new-planted orchards,                     
On this side Tiber.  He hath left them you,                        
And to your heirs forever--common pleasures,                      
To walk abroad and recreate yourselves.                           
Here was a Caesar. When comes such another?128  
 
 When he realizes that his mixture of symbols, indices, and icons has proven powerfully 
effective, Antony remarks: 
Now let it work. Mischief, thou art afoot.                      
Take thou what course thou wilt.129                          
 
                                                                                                                                                             
126 Antony turns this powerful metaphor into allegory by repeated use in what follows.  See 
RICHARD A. LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORICAL TERMS 4-6 (2d ed. 1991).  
127
 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 120, act 3, sc. 2, lines 218-24. 
128 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 234-36, 239-44. 
129 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 252-53. 
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 Hopefully the selective remarks above demonstrate why lawyers should ponder the entire 
speech and its semiotics. Hopefully the selective remarks above also demonstrate how lawyers 
who rely primarily on words rely on a much impoverished semiotics.   
VI. Semiotics and Speech Acts of Interest to Lawyers 
 Having seen how Antony orchestrates a panoply of sense with different types of signs 
and different types of expression, we can now note in more detail how lawyers encounter 
multiple types of speech acts (i.e., acts performed with signs)130 in their practice.  Although I 
shall use the term “speech act” because of its wide usage, “semiotic act” would be more accurate 
and useful since words are only one type of signs, and I would encourage such change of 
terminology. 
 A. Assertives, Directives, Commissives, Expressives, Declaratives, Verdictives 
 Although I do not claim that these are the only or definitive categories of speech acts, 
Alan Cruse lists several categories which are useful for the purposes of this article.131   
“Assertives” are speech acts that "commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition," 
such as speech acts which "state, suggest, post" or “claim" or "report."132  Stating "X has been 
banned for ninety days," is thus an example of an assertive speech act. “Directives" are speech 
                                                 
130 My semiotic definition is broader than definitions focusing only on words.  See, e.g., Speech 
Acts, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (3rd ed. 2016) (defining speech acts as  “acts 
performed when words are uttered”).  In discussing speech acts, J.L. Austin used the following 
distinctions: (1) Locutionary acts consist of “the phonetic act, of making noises, the phatic act of 
making a grammatical sentence, and the rhetic act of saying something meaningful.”  Id.  (2) 
Illocutionary acts are “what is done in saying something, such as threatening or praying or 
promising.”  Id.  (3) Perlocutionary acts are the “effects on hearers, such as frightening them.”  
Id. 
131 ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS 
374-75 (2d ed. 2004).  For earlier and “classic” overviews of speech acts, see also generally J. L. 
AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975); 
SEARLE, supra note 13, at 166. 
132 CRUSE, supra note 131, at 374. 
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acts having "the intention of eliciting some sort of action on the part of the hearer," such as 
giving an "order" or "command."133  An order of a public official that commands the banning of 
X for ninety days would be an example of such a directive speech act by directing, for example, 
a group of persons not to use X.  “Commissives” are speech acts that "commit the speaker to 
some future action” such as promising, offering, contracting, or threatening.134  “Expressives” 
are speech acts which "make known the speaker's psychological attitude to a presupposed state 
of affairs," such as praising, blaming, thanking, and congratulating.135  Blaming X for causing 
certain ills would be an example of such an expressive speech act.  “Declaratives” are speech 
acts which “bring about a change in reality” which is “over and above the fact that they have 
been carried out.”136 For example, the declaratives “I hereby resign as President” or “I hereby 
open this exhibition” make actual changes in the social fabric of the world beyond just adding 
those uttered phrases to the set of phrases uttered in this world.137  Such declaratives change who 
is President (in the former) and open up an exhibition (in the latter). Thus, in the case of 
resignation, the declarant  “would no longer hold the post [the declarant] originally held, with all 
that entails.”138  Additionally,  J.L. Austin speaks of a group of speech acts called “verdictives” 
that are such “judicial acts” such as convicting, acquitting, and fact finding.139 
 
 
                                                 
133 Id. at 374-75.  
134 Id. at 375. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. See also SEARLE, supra note 13, at 166 (recognizing “declarations, where we bring about 
changes in the world with our utterances”).  
137 See CRUSE, supra note 131, at 375. 
138 Id. 
139 AUSTIN, supra note 131, at 153.  
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 B. Other Possible Speech Act Distinctions 
 For purposes of this article, I draw from the speech act categories set forth above, 
although I acknowledge reasonable minds can differ as to how to draw performative categories 
(just as reasonable minds can differ about many other categories that we draw). One might argue, 
for example, that verdictives are in fact blends of assertives to the extent that they assert fault, 
directives to the extent that they direct a defendant to pay money, expressives to the extent that 
they blame a defendant, and declaratives to the extent that they change someone’s legal status 
through sentencing.  However, speaking of the “verdictive” is useful and timesaving for the brief 
jury exploration I do below in Section VII.  Such categories are also otherwise useful in the 
discussion of sense and meaning more broadly signified by various types of signs.  
VII. Interpretation and Construction of Speech Acts and Signs 
 Lawyers, of course, can deal with all such types of speech or semiotic acts.  In doing so, 
they can face such questions as who should count as the speaker/writer, who should count as the 
hearer/reader, and whose meaning should control.  I therefore next explore these fundamental 
semiotic issues. 
 A. Utterer/Speaker/Author vs. Hearer/Reader Meaning 
 Starting first with whose meaning should control, we must remember that to have 
meaning, we must have interpretation.  Again, Charles Sanders Peirce tells us that “nothing is a 
sign unless it is interpreted as a sign,”140 and Eco tells us that a "sign is not only something 
which stands for something else; it is also something that can and must be interpreted."141  
                                                 
140 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.306. 
141 ECO, supra note 9, at 46. 
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 Of course, utterer/author/speaker and reader/hearer meaning can differ, and this leads us 
to the question of whose (if anyone’s) meaning should prevail. As a fascinating example of such 
difference, Robert Benson tells us that the author’s meaning for The Wizard of Oz is very 
different from the way most readers understand the work today.142  According to Benson, rather 
than a fairy tale of good and evil involving a girl coming of age, the author meant the work to be 
a populist, political allegory.143   
 An abbreviated list of the author’s meanings claimed by Benson include: Dorothy as 
representing the average person, the Yellow Brick Road as representing the gold standard, 
Dorothy’s silver (as opposed to the film’s red) slippers as representing free silver money, Oz as 
an abbreviation of “ounce” (used to measure gold and silver), the Wicked Witch of the East as 
representing “capitalists and bankers,” the Tin Man as representing the factory worker, the 
Scarecrow as representing the farmer, the Munchkins as representing “the little people,” the 
Cowardly Lion as representing William Jennings Bryan, and the Wizard as representing the 
President who governs the realm by his sleight of hand.144  The typical modern reader, having 
little or no awareness of such allegory from another time, of course, will read the work quite 
differently.   
 The law is aware that author/speaker meaning can differ from reader/listener meaning.  
Thus, the Supreme Court has noted in Spence v. Washington, that “[a] person gets from a symbol 
the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is another man’s jest 
                                                 
142 ROBERT BENSON, THE INTERPRETATION GAME: HOW JUDGES AND LAWYERS MAKE THE LAW 
52-53 (2008). 
143 Id. at 52. 
144 Id. 
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and scorn.”145  That said, however, we still have the question of whose (if anyone’s) meaning 
should prevail when meanings conflict.      
 B. Whose Meaning Controls: Some Initial Definitions and Distinctions 
 Focusing on determining whether author/speaker or reader/hearer meaning should control 
in several types of nonfiction146 speech acts of particular interest to lawyers, I must next explore 
some critical distinctions that come into play in determining such operative meaning.  
  1. Interpretation vs. Construction 
 First, we should note the critical distinction between interpretation and construction (i.e., 
the linguistic or semiotic rather than the legal meaning).  Interpretation determines “the linguistic 
understanding of the provisions at issue,"147 whereas construction determines the “legal 
                                                 
145 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943) (internal quotations omitted)). 
146 I acknowledge that the default toward speaker meaning discussed below cannot consistently 
work across the realm of fiction.  Even if one focuses on author meaning in fiction, an author of 
a particular work of fiction can of course mean for readers to embrace reader meaning of the 
work. The author of a great poem, for example, can entice readers to become enmeshed in their 
own meanings that transcend and even contradict the author's. A non-fiction speaker, however, 
who claims that the child he holds in his arms is "his son" would not by that statement invite 
hearers to contradict his meaning. I will not otherwise address fictional meaning in this article.  
However, for those wishing to explore whether interpretation of fiction might shed on legal 
interpretation.  Kent Greenawalt provides an interesting discussion which ultimately concludes 
that "the differences between literary and legal interpretation are so great that an understanding 
of the first will tell us almost nothing about how the debatable practical issues concerning legal 
interpretation should be treated."  KENT GREENAWALT, REALMS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: 
CORE ELEMENTS AND CRITICAL VARIATIONS 132-37 (2018).  That said, Prof. Greenawalt does 
note, as would I, that "novels and poems, as well as biographies and autobiographies, can teach 
us about human beings and our societies" and can thus have "practical significance" for the law.  
Id. at 135-36.  I would go further and raise this claim to “great practical significance” for the law.  
See also Lloyd, supra note 45, at 132-36, for the importance of the humanities in law and legal 
education. 
147 Brian G. Slocum, Introduction, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS 
CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 1, 5 (Brian G. 
Slocum ed., 2017) [hereinafter Slocum, Introduction].  
 41 
 
meaning” of a text.148 A text's "legal meaning" includes "the authoritative meaning given to it by 
a judge,” whereas the "linguistic meaning" is "the meaning communicated by the language of the 
text in light of the appropriate context of the communication."149  For example, one can imagine 
two parties carefully addressing all the terms of a lease agreement for a term of four years and 
video recording their careful reciting of all such terms. Interpretation would involve discerning 
the linguistic meaning of such provisions. Construction would involve determining the legal 
effect of such a video-recorded agreement. If, for example, the applicable jurisdiction required 
leases of more than three years to be in writing, then one must construe the lease as 
unenforceable even though the linguistic terms might be easily interpreted. 
  2. Actual vs. Hypothetical Speaker Meaning 
 Second, by "speaker," one will find in the literature not only references to actual speakers 
in question but also to such notions as "a normal speaker of English, using [words] in the 
circumstances in which they were used"150 and "the reasonable maker of statements."151  Since 
hypothetical speakers by definition do not exist, they cannot without more provide the actual 
mind required to interpret or generate speaker meaning.152  To resolve this semiotic difficulty, we 
must derive the meaning from a real speaker who can convey the necessary intentionality.153   
                                                 
148 See id.; Brian G. Slocum, The Contribution of Linguistics to Legal Interpretation, in THE 
NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 14, 16 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017) [hereinafter Slocum, 
Contribution of Linguistics]. 
149 Slocum, Contribution of Linguistics, supra note 148, at 16.  
150 Karen Petroski, The Strange Fate of Holmes’s Normal Speaker of English, in THE NATURE OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM 
LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 105, 107 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017) (quoting Holmes).  
151 Id. at 113 (referring to Justice Thomas).  
152 See Section VII. A. above. 
153 See SEARLE, supra note 13, at 27-29 (on derived intentionality).  
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 For example, in reading a particular judicial opinion that finds that a "reasonable maker 
of statements" would "intend" X, we might derive the hypothetical speaker's intent from the 
judge who writes the opinion. We might say that she interprets the signifiers in ways that she 
believes such a hypothetical speaker would do.  We might, on the other hand, attempt to derive 
the meaning from other actual speakers such as the majority of speakers of English and may even 
sample actual speakers to such an end.  However, whomever we choose as the existing speaker 
or speakers to provide such derivative meaning, the point is to remember that such meaning is in 
fact derived, that such meaning does not come from non-existent hypothetical speakers who by 
definition cannot provide the actual intentionality required for meaning.   
 In matters of interpretation (as opposed to matters of construction), we should of course 
have doubts about using hypothetical speaker meaning in cases where we have reasonably-
discernible actual speakers whose linguistic meaning can be reasonably determined.  Where we 
can reasonably discern a speaker’s actual meaning, morally and epistemically why would we 
give her another meaning as a matter of interpretation—why would we eembrace the untruth that 
she meant something that she did not mean?  This concern will drive the two interpretation 
principles I propose in Section VII.C below. 
  3. Actual vs. Hypothetical Reader Meaning 
 Third, turning to readers, we can find distinctions in the literature between types of actual 
readers (such as between "ordinary readers" and "extremely well informed" readers.)154  We can 
also see references to hypothetical readers of various characteristics, including those having the 
                                                 
154 Kent Greenawalt, Philosophy of Language, Linguistics, and Possible Lessons about 
Originalism, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 46, 56-57 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 
2017). 
 43 
 
ability to "perceive relevant factors that are beyond the capacities of the vast majority of human 
readers."155  Thus, Justice Scalia would use a “reasonable reader, an “objectivizing construct,” 
who is aware of all the elements (such as the canons) bearing on the meaning of the text, and 
whose judgement regarding their effects is invariably sound.  Never mind no such person 
exists.”156  Preferring reality, the two interpretation principles I propose in Section VII.C below 
will prefer meanings of bills embraced by actual legislators debating and voting on such bills 
where reasonable evidence exists as to such actual legislators' meanings. The interpretation 
principles I propose default to meanings of hypothetical legislators only where actual such 
meanings are not reasonably discernible. 
  4. Controlling Meaning vs. Controlling Signifiers 
 Finally, as we examine whose meaning controls, we should not confuse questions of the 
signified with questions of appropriate signifier use.  As a matter of pure semiotics, we have seen 
that signifiers can include, for example, potentially any “concrete object,” “abstract entity,” “idea 
or ‘thought,’” “perceptible object,” “physical event,” or “imaginable object.157   
 We must remember, however, that seeking an actual speaker’s meaning conveyed by any 
such particular signifier is a separate inquiry from examining the legality of the use of such a 
signifier.  For example, trademark law protects a “word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol 
used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of others,”158 
copyright law protects “an original work of authorship (such as literary, musical, artistic, 
                                                 
155 Id. at 57. 
156 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 393.  
157 See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 80.  See also PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.230. 
158 Trademark, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (also noting that “[i]n effect, the 
trademark is the commercial substitute for one’s signature”). 
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photographic, for film work) fixed in any tangible medium of expression,”159 and criminal law 
would not permit killing a public official as a signifier of political protest.   
 Given such restrictions, a vendor's intent, for example, that a certain mark refer only to 
the vendor's products of course does not grant the vendor rights to use that mark if others have 
trademark protection for use of the mark.  Although we may be able to determine, as a matter of 
interpretation, that such a vendor meant the mark only to refer to the vendor's products (the 
vendor's intended signified), trademark law can refuse him use of such a signifier and thereby 
provide remedies to the lawful holder of the mark.  I further explore restrictions on signifier 
usage in Section IX below. 
 C. Whose Meaning Controls: Two Basic Principles 
 In light of the foregoing, I propose two principles of interpretation as the default starting 
position for non-fiction speech (or semiotic) acts. Under the "First Interpretation Principle" the 
actual speaker's meaning (as it unfolds over time) controls as a matter of interpretation where the 
actual speaker has communicated such speaker's meaning with reasonable discernibility.  
 Under the "Second Interpretation Principle" a hypothetical same-context speaker's 
meaning (as it unfolds over time) controls as a matter of interpretation where  the actual 
speaker’s meaning is not reasonably discernible due to lack of sufficient available evidence. By a 
"hypothetical, same-context speaker" here the Second Interpretation Principle means a 
hypothetical speaker who (who to the extent we can construe such a speaker) stands in the shoes 
of the actual speaker.  This includes sharing the same duties, obligations, desires, and motives as 
the speaker and otherwise acting in the same contexts as the actual speaker.  Such contexts 
include, without limitation, (i) cognitive contexts, (ii) physical and temporal contexts, (iii) social, 
                                                 
159 Copyright, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). 
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cultural, and human contexts, (iv) discourse contexts, (v) textual or internal contexts, (vi) 
purpose contexts, and (vii) policy contexts.160  Our ability to posit any such hypothetical same-
context speaker will of course vary with the circumstances.  Lesser knowledge about the speaker 
or applicable context or both will of course result in a less-refined hypothetical same-context 
speaker.  That said, we must do our best. 
 When interpreting non-fiction speech (or semiotic) acts, we would thus turn to some 
form of hypothetical speaker meaning only where (i) no actual speaker exists or (ii) an actual 
speaker has not communicated his speaker's meaning with reasonable discernibility and we lack 
sufficient information to reasonably construct a hypothetical speaker who stands in the shoes of 
the actual speaker in the manner discussed above. 
 I propose these principles because we cannot without contradiction interpret reasonably 
discernible speaker meaning to be the meaning of another person or entity unless, of course, the 
speaker intends to incorporate others' meanings. (A person or group writing a document such as 
the Declaration of independence speaking of rights given by the Creator and otherwise 
incorporating certain philosophical traditions would be such an example.  In such a case, it 
would be a mistake to ask what Jefferson, for example, himself alone meant by equality of men 
unless he meant to give the concept a meaning different from the Creator's or from the meanings 
of incorporated philosophical traditions.)  Additionally, if we fundamentally respect the right of 
speakers to speak for themselves, we cannot, as a matter of interpretation respect such right yet 
substitute the meaning of  another (whether actual or hypothetical) for such speakers' reasonably 
discernable meaning.  Furthermore, without more, we cannot, as a matter of interpretation, 
morally hold speakers accountable for others' meaning where the speaker's meaning differs and 
                                                 
160 See Lloyd, supra note 5, at 254-63. 
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is reasonably ascertainable. It is therefore difficult to disagree with Greenawalt’s claim that 
“[a]ny plausible argument for disregard of intentions must rest on claimed specific obstacles, not 
ordinary understandings.”161   
 In the above spirit, the First Interpretation Principle uses speaker meaning (as such 
meaning unfolds over time) where reasonably discernible.  In that spirit as well, the Second 
Interpretation Principle uses the hypothetical, same-context speaker meaning discussed above (as 
such meaning unfolds over time).  Since such a hypothetical speaker shares the same duties, 
obligations, desires, and motives as the speaker and otherwise acts in the same contexts as the 
actual speaker, It is thus hard to imagine another “speaker” whose meaning would more likely 
accord with the actual speaker meaning could we more clearly discern it.  
 Both such principles will also assume (as with the example of the Declaration of 
Independence example above) that intentionally incorporated terms or principles of others will 
have such others' meanings unless actual or hypothetical speaker meaning intended to change 
such meaning.  Thus, again, a person or group writing a document such as the Declaration of 
independence speaking of rights given by the Creator and otherwise incorporating certain 
philosophical and other traditions would incorporate those other meanings as they unfold in 
experience through time unless such those drafting a document such as the Declaration of 
Independence meant another meaning.  Thus, again, it would be a mistake to ask what Jefferson, 
for example, himself alone meant by equality of men in the Declaration unless he meant to put 
his own differing meaning on the concept.  We can call this the "incorporation caveat," and for 
the sake of space I will consider the incorporation caveat an unstated caveat running through the 
remainder of this article. 
                                                 
161 GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 49. 
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 D. Whose Meaning Controls: Some Applications of Interest to Lawyers  
 In light of the discussions above, I shall now apply and test the First Interpretation 
Principle and the Second Interpretation Principle using several types of non-fiction speech acts 
of interest to lawyers. Where useful, I shall also contrast construction with interpretation.   
  1. Signs, Assertives, and Tort Law 
 I begin with a simple hypothetical to lay the groundwork for more complex discussions 
that follow.  Let us imagine that we have a reasonably discernible speaker who, for example, 
asserts that “John Smith is a thief.” The First Interpretation Principle requires us to seek the 
actual speaker's meaning (as it unfolds over time) if the actual speaker has communicated such 
speaker's meaning with reasonable discernibility.  Unless there is reasonably discernible 
evidence that the speaker meant to speak ironically and not literally, we should thus as a matter 
of interpretation an assertion that Smith is a thief.  If, however, the reasonably discernible 
evidence suggests such irony, we should interpret such speech ironically.  
 However, as a matter of construction, we might reach a quite different result.  If our 
speaker’s “irony” takes on a literal meaning in the general public that harms Smith in a way that 
we feel defamation law should discourage, we might as a matter of such law construe the legal 
effect of the words literally.  For lack of space, I take no position here on the propriety of so 
doing.  I raise the point merely to make the logical distinction between interpretation and 
construction of individual assertive speech acts so that we might build upon the distinction in the 
discussion that follows. 
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  2. Signs, Commissives, and Criminal Law 
 In Elonis v. United States,162  the defendant posted online a semiotic array of items which 
on their face could be seen as threatening. For example, mixing the indexical, iconic, and 
symbolic, the defendant posted a photograph (index) of a co-worker and himself where he held a 
toy knife (icon) to the neck of the co-worker and included the caption “I wish” (symbol).163  
After he was subsequently fired, the defendant posted such language as “Y’all think it’s too dark 
and foggy to secure your facility from a man as mad as me?”164 
 The defendant also posted about his wife.  Such posts included: “Did you know it’s 
illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife?”165  After his wife obtained a “three-year protection-
from-abuse order” against the defendant, the defendant posted the following online:  
Fold up your [protection-from-abuse order] and put it in your pocket 
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?   
Try to enforce an Order that was improperly granted in the first place 
Me thinks the Judge needs an education on true threat jurisprudence 
And prison time’ll add zeros to my settlement . . . 
And if worse comes to worse 
I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the State Police and the Sheriff’s 
Department.166 
 
 The defendant also posted such other words as: 
That’s it, I’ve had about enough 
I’m checking out and making a name for myself 
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school 
shooting ever imagined 
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a Kindergarten class 
                                                 
162 See generally Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). See also Lawrence M. Solan, 
Linguistic Knowledge and Legal Interpretation: What Goes Right, What Goes Wrong, in THE 
NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 66,71-72 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017). 
163 Elonis, 135 S.Ct. at 2005. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 2006.   
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The only question is . . . which one?167  
 
 As a result of these and other posts, the defendant was charged and convicted under 18 
U.S.C. §875(c) which criminalizes the transmission in interstate commerce of “any 
communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.”168   
 How should the interpretive principles suggested above apply here? Since the identity of 
the speaker was known and since discovery should have been available in the criminal 
proceedings, the linguistic meaning of the defendant’s words should be determined by the First 
Interpretation Principle. Though his wife and former co-workers were “afraid and viewed [the 
defendant’s] posts as serious threats,”169 the speaker’s intent governs linguistic meaning here for 
the reasons discussed above. (This, again, is a separate question from (i) construction of their 
legal meaning and (ii) their wisdom or appropriateness as a moral or social matter.) Thus, as a 
matter of interpretation, we must examine evidence of actual speaker meaning (including but not 
limited to the words as evidence) to determine such linguistic meaning.  
 On their face, the signifiers’ speaker meaning could easily be interpreted as threats by use 
of, among other things, a toy knife to the throat and by use of such words as “kill” and “bullet.” 
On their face, the signifiers’ speaker meaning could also be interpreted, for example, as 
expressing contempt for the defendant’s co-workers and wife.   On the other hand, other words 
posted by the defendant (such as “Art is about pushing limits”170) and words uttered by the 
defendant in court (such as claims that his posts modeled well-known rap lyrics171) might suggest 
                                                 
167 Id. at 2006. 
168 Id. at 2004. 
169 Id. at 2007. 
170 Id. at 2006. 
171 Id. at 2007. 
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artistic intent--though many if not most of us might find such artistic intent a difficult sell.172 As 
to linguistic meaning, we might therefore well interpret these signs as threatening commissives. 
 All that said, however, one must remember that 18 U.S.C. §875(c) also requires 
construction of the legal meaning of the posts and any relevant speaker intent.  The district court 
convicted the defendant of threats under the statute, holding that conviction “required only that 
[the defendant] ‘intentionally made the communication, not that he intended to make a threat.”173  
The court of appeals upheld the conviction, holding that the statute only required “the intent to 
communicate words that the defendant understands, and that a reasonable person would view as 
a threat.”174  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, focusing on the jury instruction “that 
the Government need prove only that a reasonable person would regard [the defendant’s] 
communications as threats.”175  Rejecting this approach as effectively substituting a negligence 
standard for the criminal intent typically required by criminal statutes, the Supreme Court found 
such criminal intent would be “satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the 
purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a 
threat.”176  
 The tests for legal meanings recognized in the various stages of this case thus differ 
greatly.  At odds with the First Interpretation Principle, the district court required no intended 
                                                 
172 The speaker could also, of course, intend the same words to express contempt, threats, and 
forms of the aesthetic. 
173 Id. at 2007. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 2012. 
176 Id.at 2011-2012 (holding that “Federal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the 
results of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state” and noting  Cochran v. United 
States, 157 U.S.286, 294, 15 S.Ct. 628 (1895) which held that a defendant could encounter 
‘‘liability in a civil action for negligence, but he could only be held criminally for an evil intent 
actually existing in his mind.”) The Court thus reversed and remanded the case. ). Elonis, 135 
S.Ct. at 2013. 
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threat177 while somewhat more in line with the First Interpretation Principle the Supreme Court 
required speaker “purpose” or “knowledge, holding, again, that the criminal mental state 
required by the statute is met if the defendant communicates “for the purpose of issuing a threat, 
or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.”178   
 Given the high stakes of a criminal conviction here, the Supreme Court’s focus on the 
speaker’s intent or mental state (rather than the auditor’s) makes sense to me. Also, given the 
high stakes of such a criminal conviction, it also makes sense to me that we should in general 
have less flexibility in construing meaning that a criminal defendant might not have meant. Thus, 
construction should insist on proof beyond a reasonable doubt (rather than by a preponderance of 
the evidence) when establishing a speaker's criminal intent to convey a threat, and we can 
therefore have cases like Elonis where we might well believe that there was a linguistic threat 
while nonetheless finding no such threat as a matter of criminal construction.179  
  3. Signs, Commissives, and Private Law 
 Having thus first explored a public law example of potential commissives, we can now 
turn to private law examples of commissives. In exploring whose meaning should control in 
                                                 
177 Id. at 2007.  Again, the district court held that conviction “required only that [the defendant] 
‘intentionally made the communication, not that he intended to make a threat.” Id. 
178 Id.at 2012. I say “somewhat more in line” because the “knowledge” prong of this test may 
deviate from the First Interpretation Principle to the extent such prong recognizes unintended 
commissives.  For example, one might genuinely write verse with no intent to threaten anyone 
while knowing that some will nonetheless feel frightened. See Solan, supra note 162, at 71-72 
(noting fright as “a side effect”.)  That said, of course, we might have policy or other reasons for 
finding a threat as a matter of construction just as we might construe ironic speech as defamatory 
as suggested in Section VII.D.1 above. 
179 As Solan thus notes: “the Supreme Court made it clear that proving that Elonis intended his 
wife to draw inferences that would cause her to be intimidated was necessary to establishing that 
a crime has been committed. Until then, the literal meaning of these verses would be taken at 
face value.” Id. at 72. 
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cases of private law commissives, I first briefly examine the interpretation and construction of 
wills and then turn to the the interpretation and construction of contracts. 
   a. Signs and Wills 
 I treat wills as commissives because they commit the testator’s estate to do certain things. 
In the case of a single testator, it is hard to disagree with Greenawalt that "the intentions of the 
writer who has died are obviously key, since the will is designed to carry out her intentions."180  
From the standpoint of interpretation, it is therefore hard to see how the right default meaning is 
not the meaning of the author of the will.  In this regard, Prof. Greenawalt gives us the example 
of the testator who named in his will a person he did not know, “Robert J. Krause,” rather than  
“Robert W. Krause,” a “close friend and employee."181  Because this apparently involved 
mistaken reliance on a telephone book, the court followed the author's more likely intent.182  In 
light of the First Interpretation Principle, the court's action seems quite correct as a matter of 
interpretation.  Again, since the purpose of a will is to dispose of a testator's property as the 
testator intends,183 it runs afoul of such purpose to substitute for the actual author's meaning the 
meaning of some hypothetical ideal author or the meaning of readers whether actual or 
hypothetical.  
                                                 
180 GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 11.  Greenawalt observes that matters may be more 
complex "if a married or unmarried couple has reached an agreement about what the will of each 
would provide.  In that event, one might see a will as more like a contract."  Id.  For sake of 
space, I will keep my will discussion to that of a single testator who has made no such 
agreement, and I will discuss contracts in a separate section below.  
181 Id. at 15.  
182 Id. Such a result can be seen as either a “correction” of the will or applying the proper 
meaning of the signifier "Robert J. Krause.”  Although either frame reaches the correct result, 
from a semiotic standpoint it would seem more precise to me to say that the court sought the 
correct meaning of the signifier "Robert J. Krause.” 
183 See again id. at 11.  
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 As for construction of the legal meaning of the will, one can strongly argue that 
construction should not reach a different result.  Robert J. Krause was presumably not relying on 
receiving the property at issue so no reliance concerns should generate a different legal meaning.  
Additionally, as Greenawalt points out, reliance arguments in the case of wills can often seem of 
little weight since a testator can generally change his will at will, and "most potential recipients 
do not actually see the wills of their benefactors."184  
 Other potential reasons for construing the meaning in favor of Robert J. Krause rather 
than the more likely intended Robert W. Krause (such as will drafters’ and courts’ need for 
"clear and consistent interpretations of similar language," the difficulty of "discerning after 
someone's death what was really intended," and guarding against the possibility that evidence of 
the different meanings of terms such as “Robert J. Krause” could be manipulated.185) do not 
apply here.  Names vary so there is no “similar language” to construe consistently. Furthermore, 
it should not be difficult to determine that the testator employed and was close friends with 
Robert W. Krause rather than Robert J. Krause.  Given all this, there is little reason to worry 
about improper manipulation of meaning when recognizing that “Robert J. Krause” really meant 
the testator’s employee and close friend, Robert W. Krause. Construction should thus converge 
with interpretation in finding such a meaning. 
   b. Signs and Contracts: Williston, Corbin, and More 
 One can imagine that both a seller and a buyer intend “apples” to mean only golden 
delicious apples. If that seller agrees to sell such “apples” to that buyer upon written lawful terms 
which both parties intend in the same way, the parties linguistic meaning of “apples” no doubt 
                                                 
184 Id. at 15. 
185 See Greenawalt, supra note 154, at 50.  
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covers only golden delicious apples.  Applying a different meaning of some hypothetical speaker 
of English or of some other reader (actual or hypothetical) would change what the parties meant 
and would thus fail as a matter of interpretation.   
 This seems quite straightforward, and Steven J. Burton thus tells us that "American courts 
universally say that the primary goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the parties' 
intentions at the time they made their contract."186 To the extent the parties’ intentions are 
reasonably discernible, the First Interpretation Principle, of course, squarely accords with this 
“primary goal” and with interpreting “apples” in the contract above to mean golden delicious 
apples.   
 As for construction, it is also difficult to justify (without more) a different meaning for 
“apples” here.  In construing contracts, courts may, of course, recognize other goals than 
enforcing speaker meaning.  Such goals include fostering "the security of transactions" 
(including clarity for the parties and their assignees "about their rights, duties, and powers"), 
fostering "the peaceful settlement of disputes non-arbitrarily, in accordance with the Rule of 
Law" (which includes predictable contract interpretation that is “coherent with the law of 
contracts generally"), and "formulating legal rules that are administrable by the courts and by the 
parties."187  
 Here, however, the seller and buyer are the only parties affected by the contract, and their 
meaning of “apples” is reasonably discernible.  Construing the contract in accordance with their 
meaning thus secures their deal, should foster peaceful and non-arbitrary dispute settlement by 
                                                 
186 STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 1 (2009).  
187 See BURTON, supra note 185, at 2, 7-8. See also GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 6, 111 
(noting concerns such as judges being asked to perform functions they cannot reasonably 
perform, respecting needs of a “just and healthy society,” and “general fairness and efficiency.” ) 
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treating the parties as they intended, and should prove quite administrable by turning on 
reasonably discernible meaning and by requiring that the parties act just as they intended. 
 Having addressed both interpretation and construction of the “apples” contract above, we 
can now turn to three schools of thought addressing the reading and enforcement of contracts: 
 First, "literalism" "holds that the literal meaning of the contract's governing word or 
phrase, as found in a dictionary, determines the parties' rights, duties and powers."188  
 Second, "objectivism" "looks for the parties' intentions as expressed (manifested) in the 
contract document as a whole and its objective context, but not the parties' mental intentions;" in 
other words, it looks for “manifested intention, as a reasonable person familiar with the objective 
circumstances would understand the manifestations,” and thus “infers reasonable meaning(s) 
from the parties’ manifestations of intention in light of the circumstances, whether or not the 
meaning(s) reflect what the parties had in mind as the meaning of the terms they used.”189 Thus, 
for example, Samuel Williston looks to "the natural meaning of the writing to parties of the kind 
who contracted and at the time and place where the contract was made, and [under] such 
circumstances as surrounded its making."190  
 Third, "subjectivism" "looks for the mental intentions or knowledge of the parties when 
they manifested their intentions, taking into account all relevant evidence," although it does not 
recognize intentions which are not expressed.191  Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
                                                 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 2, 6, 51. 
190 As quoted in id. at 29. 
191 Id. at 2, 28.  See also GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 23-24 (discussing the Restatement 
(First) of Contracts’ “complex objective approach” turning on the meaning that would be given 
by "a reasonably intelligent person" who is "familiar with all operative usages and knowing all 
the circumstances other than oral statements by the parties about what they intended the words to 
mean" and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ “more subjective approach.”)  See also 
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provides: “Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a 
term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning."192 
 As phrased, the literalism option can be quickly dispatched for both interpretation and 
construction.  Since words typically have multiple definitions and can thus have multiple 
“literal” senses, literalism cannot work as a matter of interpretation. Even if parties to a contract 
have used terms in a dictionary sense, the dictionary (with its multiple definitions of terms) 
cannot itself tell us which sense the parties used.  Additionally, literalism would lead us astray 
where parties have not used terms in a standard or “dictionary” sense. Literalism fairs no better 
with construction.  Given such multiple “literal” definitions of terms, construction also requires 
more than just a dictionary.  Even if a judge is to construe contracts in accordance with the 
dictionary meanings of terms, a judge must have some method of determining which of these 
“literal” dictionary meanings apply.  
 Objectivism also fails for both interpretation and construction.  Since it would divorce 
itself from the parties' "mental intentions," and, in Williston’s words, it would look for "the 
natural meaning of the writing to parties of the kind who contracted at the time and place where 
the contract was made, and [under] such circumstances as surrounded its making”193 rather than 
what the parties actually meant, such "objectivism" cannot work as a general rule of 
interpretation.  If the parties’ meaning is reasonably ascertainable, interpretation should give 
                                                                                                                                                             
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (AM. LAW INST. 1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 201 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Additionally, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) notes that “the relevant intention of a party is 
that manifested by him rather than any different undisclosed intention.”  The First Restatement 
reflects Williston’s objectivism while the Second Restatement reflects Arthur Corbin’s greater 
subjectivism.  See KENT GREENAWALT, LEGAL INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER 
DISCIPLINES AND PRIVATE TEXTS 265-67. 
192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
193 As quoted in BURTON, supra note 185, at 29. 
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them that meaning for the reasons set forth in Section VII.C above.  Objectivism also fails as a 
general rule of construction.  Again, if the seller and buyer are the only parties affected by the 
“apples” contract and their meaning of “apples” is reasonably discernible, why should they not 
have their contract for golden delicious apples?  Again, construing the contract in accordance 
with their meaning secures their deal, should foster peaceful and non-arbitrary dispute settlement 
by treating the parties as they intended, and should prove quite administrable by turning on 
reasonably discernible meaning and by requiring that the parties act just as they intended. 
 Of the three approaches above, this therefore leaves us with "subjectivism," the approach 
which, again, "looks for the mental intentions or knowledge of the parties when they manifested 
their intentions, taking into account all relevant evidence."194  As an approach to interpretation, 
this approach on its face accords with the emphasis that the First Interpretation Principle and 
Second Interpretation Principle place upon speaker meaning.  As a matter of construction, this 
approach would also give the seller and buyer in the “apples” contract above their contract for 
golden delicious (and only golden delicious) apples.  In doing so, this approach would also 
construe the contract in accordance with the parties’ meaning thus secures their deal, would 
likely foster peaceful and non-arbitrary dispute settlement by treating the parties as they 
intended, and should prove highly administrable by turning on reasonably discernible meaning 
and by requiring that the parties act just as they intended. Common construction policies are thus 
advanced by such an approach. 
 Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts correctly interprets and construes the 
following similar example: 
                                                 
194 Id. at 2. 
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A and B are engaged in buying and selling shares of stock from each other, and agree 
orally to conceal the nature of their dealings by using the word "sell" to mean "buy" and 
using the word “buy" to mean "sell." A sends a written offer to B to "sell" certain shares, 
and B accepts. The parties are bound in accordance with the oral agreement.195  
 
This example squarely accords with the First Interpretation Principle to the extent the parties’ 
odd use of terms is reasonably ascertainable.  As for construction, recognizing the parties’ 
meaning secures their deal, should foster peaceful and non-arbitrary dispute settlement by 
treating the parties as they intended, and, again, should prove quite administrable by turning on 
reasonably discernible meaning and by requiring that the parties act just as they intended. 
 A change of facts could, of course, change this result as a matter of both interpretation 
and construction.  For example, as a matter of interpretation, if A and B both die and their heirs 
are left to settle the contract, A’s and B’s speaker meaning may no longer be reasonably 
discernible.196  If such speaker meaning is no longer reasonably discernible, in the view 
advanced by this article, the "Second Interpretation Principle" would turn if reasonably possible 
to a hypothetical same-context speaker's meaning in the case of party A and in the case of party 
B.  Again, our ability to posit any such hypothetical same-context speaker will of course vary 
with the circumstances, and lesser knowledge about the speaker or applicable context or both 
will of course result in a less-refined hypothetical same-context speaker.  That said, we must do 
our best when we attempt interpretation.  
                                                 
195 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See 
also BURTON, supra note 185, at 28. 
196 Again, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) provides: 
“Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, 
it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.”  However, again, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) also notes that “the relevant intention of a 
party is that manifested by him rather than any different undisclosed intention.”  In this changed 
hypothetical, to use the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) terminology, the original “manifested” intent 
may no longer be discernible. 
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 That said, construction here can also result in a legal meaning of contract terms that 
differs from their linguistic meaning.  Again, in enforcing contracts, courts may recognize other 
goals than respecting speaker meaning, such as fostering "the security of transactions" (including 
clarity for the parties and their assignees "about their rights, duties, and powers"), fostering "the 
peaceful settlement of disputes non-arbitrarily, in accordance with the Rule of Law" (which 
includes predictable contract interpretation that is “coherent with the law of contracts 
generally"), and "formulating legal rules that are administrable by the courts and by the 
parties."197   
 Under these changed facts where the death of A and B leaves their original speaker 
meaning no longer reasonably discernible, these construction goals may well require construing 
"buy" to mean “buy” and “sell” to mean “sell.” Fostering peaceful resolutions of disputes may 
itself suffice for such construction where there is no reasonably discernible evidence that such 
terms were used in their opposite senses.  
 A different change of facts could also raise construction concerns such as promoting 
“security of transactions.”  If, for example, the contract is assigned while A and B are still living, 
and the assignee does not know that A and B had orally agreed to alter the meanings of "buy" 
and "sell," promoting “security of transactions” strongly weighs in favor of construing “buy” to 
mean “buy” and “sell” to mean “sell” to protect the “innocent” assignee. Since the assignor (A or 
                                                 
197 BURTON, supra note 185, at 2, 7-8. See also GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 6, 111 (noting 
concerns such as judges being asked to perform functions they cannot reasonably perform, 
respecting needs of a “just and healthy society,” and “general fairness and efficiency.” ) 
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B) would be in a superior position of knowledge, the assignor in such a case should be forthright 
in informing the assignee of any special meaning of terms.198   
  4. Signs and Directives 
 In exploring whose meaning should govern in the case of directives, I next briefly 
explore the question of legislation and speaker meaning.  For the further reasons discussed 
below, the First Interpretation Principle and the Second Interpretation Principle should again 
control interpretation where reasonably possible.  For reasons of space, I limit my discussions 
here to interpretation and do not explore construction.  
   a. Signs and Legislative Intent 
 To apply the First Interpretation Principle and the Second Interpretation Principle in 
legislation, we must be able to identify the relevant speaker intent.  This is, of course, more 
complex than identifying the intent of a single testator or the intent of the two individual parties 
to the “apples” contract above.  Given the multiple parties involved in legislation (such as the 
legislators and the executive who signs such legislation, not to mention staff and others who may 
be involved in drafting legislation), identifying the relevant speaker intent may seem daunting 
and even impossible.  Additionally, since a legislature is not itself a thinking being, we might of 
course ask whether it can ever make logical sense to speak of legislative intent. 
   b. Signs and Legislatures as Speech Actors 
 In tackling these issues, we should remember that we create our concepts and that we 
judge them by their workability.199 We should thus recognize with Gerald MacCallum, Jr. that 
                                                 
198 Thus, where parties have differing meanings as to terms, the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts in §201(2) sensibly addresses such differing meanings in terms of which party is at 
fault, and §201(3) recognizes no mutual assent where meanings differ and neither party knew the 
other’s meaning or should have known such meaning.  See also BURTON, supra note 185, at 62 
& n. 109.  
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the question here is not just “Are legislatures capable of intent?” We should also be asking 
whether the notion of legislative intent is useful.200  If such a concept is useful, we should fashion 
a concept of legislative intent in a way that works most effectively. 
 Such a concept is no doubt useful. It continues (and helps us grapple with) a long judicial 
tradition of seeking "legislative intent," a tradition that respects the "principle of legislative 
supremacy" by recognizing the supremacy of laws enacted by the legislature.201   
 Additionally, understanding "legislative intent" as part of a legislative speech act is 
consistent with Constitutional references to Congress as an actor.  For example, Article I speaks 
of "legislative Powers" that are "vested in" Congress, and speaks of each house of Congress 
being the “Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members."202  How can 
we speak of Congress as such a rational Constitutional actor if we cannot also find a way to 
speak of its having intent to act in certain ways?  
    i. Signs and Legislatures’ Speech Acts 
 
 How, then, can we go about speaking of legislative intent in a workable way?  We must 
identify a workable speaker or speech actor that can have such legislative intent. Rather than 
losing oneself in the swirl of individual and collective legislator minds, I would define the 
legislature itself (not some combination of legislators) as the speaker or speech actor.  Consistent 
with that approach, I would then maintain that a legislature’s legislative (and thus directive) 
                                                                                                                                                             
199 Lloyd, supra note 27, at 264-74 (discussing workability). 
200 See GERALD C. MACCALLUM, JR., LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW, 
POLITICS, AND MORALITY 34–35 (Marcus G. Singer & Rex Martin eds., 1993). 
201 M. B. W. Sinclair, Legislative Intent: Fact or Fabrication?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1329, 
1331 (1997). 
202 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 5. 
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speech act occurs when a sufficient majority of legislators have voted in the manner provided by 
law to adopt a “legislative proposal offered for debate.”203   
 In other words, a legislature itself  “speaks” legislatively upon the adoption in the manner 
provided by law of “legislative proposal[s] offered for debate.”204 I would thus agree with 
Richard Ekins’ that instead of a “sum of intentions held by each member of the majority,” “what 
is held in common amongst legislators” is a common “proposal” they deliberate and vote 
upon.205  I would thus also hold that the meaning of such legislation is the meaning of the 
proposals offered for debate and adopted.206   
    ii. Signs and Interpreting Legislatures’ Speech Acts207 
 Of course, if the meaning of a legislative directive speech act is the meaning of the 
proposals offered for debate and adopted,208 we must ask whose take on such meaning controls.   
Again, as Peirce reminds us, “nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign.”209  We must 
                                                 
203 See Bill, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999); WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, 
THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 33-35 (7th ed. 1989) (summarizing and diagramming how 
“a bill becomes a law”); RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 230-31 (2012). 
204 Id. 
205 EKINS, supra note 203, at 231. 
206 Id. Though any such legislative proposal will have been adopted at a specific point in time, 
that is not to say that better and fuller understandings of such legislative speaker meaning cannot 
thereafter develop over time. See Section VIII below. 
207 For reasons of space, I consider only interpretation of legislative speech acts. In addition to 
the linguistic meaning of a statute, construction of the statute can (as in the case of other speech 
acts) provide a different legal meaning than the linguistic one.  For example, in accordance with 
the lenity canon, a court might construe a statute more narrowly than its linguistic meaning.  See 
POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 191-193 (Carolina Academic Press 
2006).  Thus, a court might construe a criminal statute in favor of "modern reader understanding" 
in light of the "general principle that people should receive ‘fair warning’ of what behavior is 
criminal."  See GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 63. 
208 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. Though any such legislative proposal will have 
been adopted at a specific point in time, that is not to say that better and fuller understandings of 
such legislative speaker meaning cannot thereafter develop over time.  
209 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.306. 
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thus ask whose interpretation governs in the case of such debated and adopted legislative 
proposals?  
 Legislators are the elected officials who debate and vote on bills, and we must therefore 
seek as best we can their meaning of proposals offered for debate and adopted. Using meanings 
assigned by other speakers or hearers would effectively usurp the legislators’ role.  As Michael 
Sinclair puts it when speaking of legislatures, “Legislators are elected . . . .   [and] To allow [a] 
‘hearer’s’ meaning to triumph . . . would be anti-democratic and would allow the triumph of non-
elective law making over the normal, elective law-making.”210  
 In an ideal situation, legislators objectively speak with a common voice about the 
meaning of the proposal, and such common voice is reasonably and objectively discernible from 
the legislative history or otherwise.  Of course, the reality of the legislative process is no doubt 
rarely if ever so ideal.211  What are we to do when an actual common voice is not reasonably and 
objectively discernible?   
 In such a case, the Second Interpretation Principle requires that we attempt as best we can 
to construct a common voice of hypothetical legislators who have the same duties, obligations, 
desires, motives, and other contexts as the legislators involved in the particular legislative 
process. It is hard to see how we can do better if, again, we are to do our best to avoid “the 
triumph of non-elective law making.”212  Consistent with the Second Interpretation Principle, this 
gives us the initial meaning of the legislation, which meaning is unleashed into experience and 
thus develops through time as discussed in Section VIII below. 
                                                 
210 See Sinclair, supra note 201, at 1388.  
211 As Prof. Slocum notes, "due to the enormous volume of legislation and other reasons, most 
legislators do not read most of the text of the statutes on which they vote."  Slocum, Contribution 
of Linguistics, supra note 148, at 33.  
212 See Sinclair, supra note 201, at 1388.  
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 Discerning such meaning can, of course, be difficult and subject to reasonable dispute.  
As I have written before, the pragmatics of finding speaker meaning is often complex, and 
reasonable minds can often disagree as to the results of such a process.213  Not only is this the 
case with ordinary judges of speaker meaning, it is also the case with judges having the 
characteristics the “ideal” judge Eunomia.214  Law, however, requires answers in particular cases, 
and we must do our best to find and provide such answers in a way that, again, avoids “the 
triumph of non-elective law making.”215  
 For example, one can imagine a statute that simply reads “monarchs can only be killed in 
the month of June," and one can also imagine that the statute does not define "monarch," that all 
the legislators involved are dead, and that no legislative history for the statute survives.  On the 
face of things, we cannot have rule of law if readers or judges can simply pick whatever meaning 
of "monarch" they personally find most appropriate—especially if they pick a meaning that 
allows regicides in the month of June. 
 Instead, we must look at the statute through the eyes of our hypothetical legislators 
having the same duties, obligations, desires, motives, and other contexts as the legislators 
involved in the particular legislative process.  If, for example, these legislators swore to uphold 
the laws of the land and if these laws forbade murder, "monarch" cannot mean "king" or "queen."  
This would all the more be the case if such legislators operated in a system with a king or queen 
as head of state,    
 Again looking through the eyes of our hypothetical legislators having the same duties, 
obligations, desires, motives, and sharing the other contexts as the legislators involved in the 
                                                 
213 See generally Lloyd, supra note 5; see also Lloyd, supra note 27, at 244-50. 
214 See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 244-50.   
215 See Sinclair, supra note 201, at 1388.  
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particular legislative process, we must thus look for a meaning other than "king" or "queen."  If, 
for example, the statute was passed at a time when newspapers and other non-legislative 
historical records note the near unanimous consent among the public that insects should be 
protected from extinctions and that limiting the hunting of monarch butterflies to the month of 
June was imperative to that insect’s survival, interpreting "monarch" as the monarch butterfly 
could make good sense. Since the original legislators were part of that near-unanimous public, 
interpreting "monarch" as the butterfly would thus link "monarch" killing to the month of June in 
a reasonable fashion that accords with the views and obligations of our same-context 
hypothetical legislators.   
 As further discussed in Section VIII below, when deciding upon such a meaning, we 
must always remember, however, that the sense of monarch or of any other term involves the 
total actual and possibly-conceivable ways in which such sense unfolds or can unfold in 
experience.  Since no finite mind can conceive of all the possible ways a term might unfold 
through time, no legislator's understanding of a term at given points in time can grasp all the 
possible ways that term's sense can play out in ever-unfolding experience.  We must therefore 
take care to distinguish between meaning and understanding (original or otherwise).  Thus, I 
discuss the unfolding of sense though time in more detail in Section VIII.B below and the 
unfolding of reference through time in more detail in Section VIII.A below.  
   c. Scalia’s Less-Tethered Hypothetical Directive Meaning 
 To put the Second Interpretation Principle's hypothetical legislators in further context, 
Justice Scalia and his followers also rely upon hypothetical constructs, though they rely on much 
looser constructs than the Second Interpretation Principle's hypothetical same-context legislators. 
Claiming that we are “governed by what the laws say, and not by what the people who drafted 
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the laws intended,”216 Justice Scalia would, again, use his “reasonable reader, an 'objectivizing 
construct,' who is aware of all the elements (such as the canons) bearing on the meaning of the 
text, and whose judgement regarding their effects is invariably sound.  Never mind no such 
person exists.”217   
 Of course, those concerned with improper judicial activism should worry about judges 
using such a hypothetical reader construct.  Again, for the reasons discussed above in 
VII.D.4.b.ii, rule of law cannot prioritize reader over legislative speaker meaning in statutory 
interpretation.218  Additionally, if we do not include the Second Interpretation Principle within 
"all the elements (such as the canons) bearing on the meaning of the text," we increase judicial 
interpretive discretion. We do that by ignoring restraints and suggestions of meaning provided by 
the duties, obligations, desires, motives, and other contexts restraining and informing the 
hypothetical legislators under the Second Interpretation Principle.219  
 
 
 
                                                 
216 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 378.  
217 Id. at 393.  
218 See again Sinclair, supra note 201, at 1388.  
219 To continue with "monarch" statutes, one can imagine, for example, a statute that simply 
reads “monarchs are banned.” Imagine also that the only reference to what “monarchs” means is 
in the legislative history, and resort to legislative history is banned. See Scalia & Garner, supra 
note 1, at 388 (“use of legislative history is not just wrong; it violates constitutional requirements 
of nondelegability, bicameralism, presidential participation, and the supremacy of judicial 
interpretation in deciding the case presented.”) A “reasonable reader” here might therefore read 
that term as referring to either butterflies or kings.  However, a hypothetical legislator who 
shares the same duties, obligations, desires, motives, and other context as the bulk of legislators 
involved in the particular legislative process must interpret “monarchs” as butterflies if the 
legislative history shows that this was the meaning debated. Such an approach no doubt leaves 
much less room for “judicial activism” here--at least where reliance on legislative history is 
banned. 
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  5. Signs and Verdictives  
 In exploring whose meaning should control in verdictives (which again consist of such 
speech acts as convicting, acquitting, and fact finding)220 and as another example of speaker 
meaning that avoids attempted fusion of disparate individual intents, I briefly now explore the 
example of a jury that finds a defendant negligent in a slip and fall case and awards the plaintiff 
damages in the amount of $100,000.00.    
  Although not an enduring entity like a legislature, the jury’s group speech acts require a 
certain number of votes of members of the body.  For example, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide that “[u]nless the parties stipulate otherwise, the verdict must be unanimous 
and must be returned by a jury of at least six members.”221 
 For purposes of the example here, we can posit a jury of six persons in a civil case where 
a majority rather than a unanimous verdict is required.  After several days of deliberation, the 
jury in the jury room by a vote of five to one finds a defendant drugstore negligent in a slip and 
fall case and awards the plaintiff damages in the amount of $100,000.  One of the jurors did not 
think the drugstore was negligent.  Although five of the jurors did find the drugstore negligent, 
none of them individually initially thought $100,000 was the proper damage amount.  They each 
had different amounts in mind but finally compromised on $100,000 as a fair amount. 
 On these facts, the jury’s verdictive speech act is the determination that the defendant 
was negligent and that the grant to the plaintiff should be a damage award of $100,000.  This 
verdictive speech act is not some sum of the individual intents or acts of six separate jurors (or of 
the subset of five who voted in favor of the verdict).  Instead, it is the verdictive speech act of the 
                                                 
220 AUSTIN, supra note 131, at 153.  
221 FED. R. CIV. P. 48(b). 
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jury as a separate entity, which speech act occurs because the requisite majority of jurors voted 
to find liability and to award damages in the compromise amount of $100,000, an amount 
differing from the amount individual jurors would have awarded without the need of 
compromise.   
 However, as with legislators in the legislative example above, that is not to say that 
individual jurors’ statements, intents, and purposes are irrelevant to the interpretation and 
construction of the group verdict.  The jury can be polled to confirm each juror’s vote.222  If, for 
example, a tired foreman erroneously left a zero off the jury’s verdict form and filled out the 
verdict form with the sum "$10,000" rather than "$100,000," we would hope for a poll to verify 
the award amount.223  In such a case, the jurors' intent for "$10,000" to mean one hundred 
thousand dollars should of course be controlling.  Additionally, turning from interpretation to 
construction, if, for example, the dissenting juror has evidence that the five voted against the 
drugstore because they were bribed, the dissenting juror should of course be heard in considering 
whether the verdict should be construed as unlawful.224  In all such cases, however, the jury’s 
verdictive speech act is a separate speech act apart from the intents and purposes of the 
individual jurors.   
 When reading the jury's verdict form, there should therefore be little question that the 
First Interpretation Rule should control here.  We can reasonably discern both the jurors’ identity 
and their intent as to the verdict the majority approved.  Reader meaning, on the other hand, 
might find an erroneous "plain meaning" of $10,000 unless the reader was aware of the actual 
                                                 
222 FED. R. CIV. P. 48(c). 
223 See also FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3) (addressing “Answers Inconsistent with the Verdict” and 
49(b)(4) addressing “Answers Inconsistent with Each Other and the Verdict”). 
224 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(B) (permitting jurors to testify regarding whether “an 
outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror”). 
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jurors' meaning and factored that meaning into interpretation.  But would this not return us to the 
jury's speaker meaning as understood by the jurors? Use of a hypothetical jury’s meaning (which 
could differ from the actual jury's meaning) would on its face be inappropriate here since we can 
reasonably discern both the jurors’ identity and their intent as to the verdict the majority 
approved. Both the First Interpretation Principle and the Second Interpretation Principle thus 
soundly direct us to the actual verdictive act as understood by the actual jurors. 
VIII. Meaning and Time: Signs, Originalism, and the Fixation of Meaning Debate 
 Having addressed multiple aspects of the semiotics of meaning, we can now briefly turn 
to the semiotics of meaning and time. Even though meaning is not transcendentally fixed,225 
there remains the question of whether meaning somehow becomes fixed within our webs of signs 
at the time such meaning is first signified.  For example, Justice Scalia's version of the "fixed-
meaning canon" holds "that words must be given the meaning they had when the text was 
adopted."226  To answer this question, we must distinguish between the reference and the sense 
component of meaning and provide an answer for each. To answer this question, we must also be 
careful to distinguish between understanding and sense with sense, again, being the broader total 
actual and possibly-conceivable ways in which notions unfold or can unfold in ever-changing 
experience.  Given our lack of omniscience, our understanding of a term at any given point in 
time will always thus be narrower than the term's sense. 
 A. Time and Reference of Signs 
 With respect to the reference component of meaning within our webs of signs, we can in 
many cases, at least, consider fixation the default (but only the default) position, even though 
                                                 
225 See Section III.B above. 
226 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 428.   
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such reference is not transcendentally fixed.  If, for example, we say that a lawyer gave a speech 
on  March 14, 2019, we would ordinarily say reference to the speech itself remains fixed within 
our discourse even though we may from time to time reach different conclusions as to what was 
meant by that speech.  That is, we might debate the meaning of the speech over time but we 
would ordinarily say that we are referring within our discourse to the same speech.  
 However, though fixation is thus the initial default with reference, we can nonetheless 
say that reference can and should change in certain situations within our discourse.  For example, 
if we learn that X rather than Y was the first person to write a treatise on the interpretation of 
contracts, we will thus change the reference of the phrase "the first person to write a treatise on 
contracts" from Y to X.  Since reference is not transcendentally fixed,227 we can make such 
correction.  Thus, reference can be refined or changed by refining definite descriptions as 
discussed above in Section III.B.1.a.   
 B. Time, Sense, and Understanding of Signs 
 For at least the four reasons discussed below, fixation of sense claims are at best 
tautological and at worst erroneous.  First, since sense is the total actual and possibly-
conceivable ways in which notions unfold or can unfold in experience, 228 "freezing" or fixing 
                                                 
227 See again Section III.B.1.a above.  Although reference is not transcendentally fixed, it does 
provide stability in the rule of law.  Taking again our butterfly statute that provides “monarchs 
are banned," the sense of "monarch" cannot shift through time to mean "royal head of state" 
without a corresponding change in the reference. Such unlinking a statute from one referent and 
linking it to a radically different referent no doubt requires appropriate state action if we are to 
have rule of law.  Again, this is not to say that the sense or understanding or bothof monarch 
cannot unfold over time: we can discover new colors of the monarch, we can come to see the 
monarch as no longer endangered, we can come to see the monarch in new symbolic ways, etc.  
See Section VIII.B below. This is also not to say that reference cannot be refined (as opposed to 
changed) by refining definite descriptions as discussed above in Section III.B.1.a.  The 
discussion above of the referent of marriage provides such an example.  See id. 
228 See Section III.B.2.a above. 
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such sense at best simply "fixes" such sense as such possible as well as actual unfoldings in ever-
unfolding and ever-changing experience.  Such a tautology thus hardly rules out possibilities of 
sense yet ungrasped by any current understanding as experience always continues to unfold.229   
 Second, since meaning plays out in ever-changing experience, such experience itself 
brings its own changes to the unfolding of meaning. We now, for example, must debate whether 
"marriage" in an older statute includes same-sex marriage given the social and legal changes in 
the concept of marriage. Marriage now means something very different today230 than it meant 
when only members of the opposite sex could marry, when women were belittled by 
coverture,231 or when many heterosexual blacks were barred from the institution entirely as 
slaves.232  Thus, we also now see such definitions of marriage as “A legal union between two 
persons that confers certain privileges and entails certain obligations of each person to the other, 
formerly restricted in the United States to a union between a woman and a man” (emphasis 
added).233  This definition notes how the meaning of marriage has unfolded through time by 
highlighting removal of a once necessary element: a union of those of the opposite sex.234  
Consistent with this unfolding of the concept of marriage through time, Peirce eloquently and 
presciently tells us that: 
                                                 
229 As explored in Section VII above, we could non-tautologically speak of affixation of meaning 
such as whose meaning should we affix to certain signs. 
230 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
231 See generally Amber Bailey, Comment, Redefining Marriage: How the Institution of 
Marriage Has Changed to Make Room for Same-Sex Couples, 27 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 
305 (2012).  
232 See generally Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 299 (2006). 
233 Marriage, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016). 
234 Id.  
 72 
 
A symbol [such as a word], once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and in 
experience, its meaning grows. Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage, bear for us 
very different meanings from those they bore to our barbarous ancestors.235  
  
 Third, precedent presents an obvious legal example of such experiential change.  A 
court’s determination of statutory meaning is legally binding so long as the precedent lasts or 
until the legislature amends the statute to provide other meaning.236  Precedent broadly presents 
problems for any alleged fixation of meaning unless perhaps one considers the possibility of 
"relying on precedents" as part of the original meaning.237 But if "relying on precedents" is part 
of the original meaning, this would reaffirm that the meaning is not fixed but can change as 
precedent requires.238  
 Fourth, such fixation claims are wrong to the extent they ignore the fact that speakers can 
actually intend for their concepts to unfold over time.  A group of legislators, for example, could 
intend that a statutory concept of "marriage" for which they vote should evolve with less-
discriminatory lay understandings of marriage over time.  In any case, where the purpose of a 
statute is to govern future behavior, would it not be reasonable to imagine those involved in 
passage of the statute assumed (unless perhaps they tried to include a fixation clause along the 
                                                 
235 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.302. As Blake also powerfully notes: “Reason, or the ratio of all we 
have already known, is not the same that it shall be when we know more.” See WILLIAM BLAKE, 
There is No Natural Religion, in POEMS AND PROPHECIES 4 (Alfred A. Knopf 1991). 
236 See e.g. Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeal, 73 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV 317 (2005).  Although beyond the scope of this paper, Barrett notes various arguments as 
to the proper force of such stare decisis.  For example, she notes that “One line of thought 
interprets Congress’s silence following the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a statute as 
approval of that interpretation. If Congress had disagreed with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation, the argument goes, Congress would have amended the statute to reflect its 
disagreement.” Id. At 317. 
237 See Greenawalt, supra note 154, at 55-56.  
238 See id. I lack the space to explore originalism and precedent in further detail here.  I hope to 
do so in a further future article. 
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lines discussed below in this Section VIII.B) that meanings of the statute would unfold in 
sensible ways in such future experience?  
 One can also, of course, give countless lay examples of such intended unfolding of sense. 
If I write letter to a friend telling him that he is always welcome at “my house,” it would not 
make sense in such an endless invitation for the meaning of “my house” to be frozen as of the 
time of writing.  I am not inviting my friend to a house frozen in time beyond reach but to a 
house that exists in time and thus changes in physical and other ways including social ways. As 
social standards (such as desirability and price), for example, unfold over time, understandings of 
"my house" will unfold accordingly in those regards as well.    
 In light of these four points, we should return briefly to Justice Scalia's version of the 
"fixed-meaning canon" which, again, provides "that words must be given the meaning they had 
when the text was adopted."239 Could we perhaps make more sense of Justice Scalia's canon by 
modifying it to apply only to statutes which expressly include a "freezing" or fixation clause 
such as: "terms used in this statute shall have the meanings in effect as of the date of passage of 
this statute"?  Even ignoring how we should handle the specific phrase "meaning in effect" 
(whose meaning? does "meaning" here mean understanding rather than sense?), it is hard to see 
how such a modification would work.  First, we have the problem with precedent discussed 
above.  Second, we cannot understand such "frozen" meanings apart from how they actually and 
possibly play out in ever-unfolding and ever-changing experience. But to say this, of course, is to 
say such meanings are not fixed except perhaps, again, in some tautological sense such as the 
                                                 
239 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 428.  Justice Scalia does, for example, temper this 
canon with such provisos as his "principle of interrelating canons ("No canon of interpretation is 
absolute. Each may be overcome by the strength of differing principles that point in other 
directions") and his recognition that "general terms may embrace later technological 
innovations." Id. at 59, 16. 
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meaning adopted by the legislature with the "fixation" clause is the meaning adopted by the 
legislature with the "fixation" clause. 
 C. Time and Application of Signs 
 Those who would "freeze" or fix meaning240 might try to respond that applications or 
extensions of concepts change rather than the concepts themselves.  For example, such persons 
might maintain that the original concept of marriage above has not changed but that instead we 
now have new "extensions" or “applications” of the term “marriage."  Such persons might claim 
that marriage is a general concept that does not purport to name every person, place, thing, or 
event to which the concepts possibly extend.241  They might claim that such general concepts 
give us the "criteria" or other guidance we need to determine what specific things or events are 
included within the concepts; for example, the concept of "green" gives us the "criteria" or other 
guidance we need to pick out actual green things in the world.242  Those who would "freeze" or 
fix meaning might thus attempt to parse between concepts (which do not change) and 
applications of those concepts, where applications may include applications not contemplated at 
the time of a statute’s passage. 
 The unfolding of the concept of marriage through time, however, on its face does not 
permit such an approach.  Where a union of members of the opposite sex was an original element 
of the concept of marriage,243 current application of the concept of marriage to same-sex parties 
                                                 
240 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 435 (“A legal text should be interpreted through 
the historical ascertainment of meaning that it would have conveyed to a fully informed observer 
at the time when the text first took effect.”). Of course, would not a fully informed observer at 
any time know that concepts can unfold over time in unforeseen directions? 
241 As Michael Sinclair notes, “A legislature cannot normally enact extensions; they would be 
simply too particular.”  Sinclair, supra note 201, at 1370. 
242 See, e.g., id. at 1350. 
243 Marriage, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016). 
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would be impossible without a change in the very concept of marriage that eliminates the 
opposite-sex requirement.  Additionally, again, the meaning of the "criteria" given by concepts 
for application of such concepts cannot be fully fixed since we cannot understand "frozen" 
meanings outside of the very time and unfolding of experience required to understand them at 
any point in time. 
 In saying this, however, I do not deny that we apply concepts. Judicial opinions, for 
example, of course apply concepts when such opinions apply rules to the case at hand.  However, 
such application is necessarily performed in the context of then-unfolding experience, which 
experience bears the marks of prior experience to date.  Additionally, I fully acknowledge the 
importance of application since sense itself unfolds through experience, and application involves 
such unfolding of sense.  One cannot therefore have a reasonable understanding of concepts 
apart from reasonably grasping such unfolding of meaning through application.   Thus, Gadamer 
can correctly say that “[a]pplication does not mean first understanding a given universal in itself 
and then afterward applying it to a concrete case.  It is the very understanding of the universal—
the text—itself.”244  For the fullest sense of "understanding," I would therefore agree with 
Gadamer that “understanding always involves applying the meaning understood.”245  If sense 
unfolds through experience, how could we say otherwise?246  This point is magnified by the fact 
                                                 
244 GADAMER, supra note 98, at 336.  I would also agree that "[i]t is only in all its applications 
that the law becomes concrete. Thus the legal historian cannot be content to take the original 
application of the law as determining its original meaning."  Id. at 322. 
245 Id. at 328.  I thus also agree with Gadamer that "application is neither a subsequent nor 
merely an occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, but co-determines it as a whole 
from the beginning."  Id. at 321. 
246 Cf. PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 1.219 (“What I mean by the idea’s conferring exist upon the 
individual members of the class is that it confers upon them the power of working out results in 
this world, that it confers upon them, that is to say, organic existence, or, in one word, life.”) 
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that sense is determined by context,247 and that the sense of context, like other sense, also unfolds 
through experience.248  However, in addition to the unfolding of meaning through time by the 
applications of concepts through time, I would be clear that concepts themselves (as with the 
case of marriage above) can evolve through time in ways that change application itself.   
 D. Time and Signifier Drift 
 In addition to such evolving meaning of the signified through time, signifiers through 
signifier drift can also refer to different or additional signifieds over time. For example, the 
Middle English verbal signifier for a road was “rode”249  though the signifier "rode" now 
signifies the past tense of "ride."  Such signifier change through time is often used as a primary 
argument by originalists: we must, the argument goes, be originalists to avoid confusion in light 
of such signifier drift.250  
 This argument, however, does not address the fact that the signified (such as the meaning 
of the word "marriage") can unfold over time. Instead, this argument focuses on the different 
case of signifier drift.   
 If  the signifier “X” signified the concept A when used in a statute but now signifies the 
concept B, we must of course recognize that the original statute signifies the concept A rather 
                                                 
247 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at xxvii (“Nothing but conventions and contexts cause a 
symbol or sound to convey a particular idea.”). 
248 As I am not dealing with pragmatics in detail in this article, I will not also explore problems 
finding “fixed” sense that result from any differences in experience and understanding of an 
author and a reader.  See, e.g., PEIRCE, supra note 6, at 5.506 (discussing the imprecision flowing 
from the fact that “no man’s interpretation of words is based on exactly the same experiences as 
any other man’s”); GADAMER, supra note 98, at 272 (“The recognition that all understanding 
inevitably involves some prejudice gives the hermeneutical problem its real thrust.”). 
249 See Road, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed.  2014). 
250 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 78, 82 (discussing what Queen Anne may once have 
meant by “awful, artificial, and amusing”).   
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than the concept B.  However, this does not mean that we should ignore the ways the concepts A 
and B themselves unfold over time.   
 Confusing signifier drift with the unfolding of concepts through time thus conflates the 
signifier with the signified (and we might add that fallacy to the list of logical fallacies lawyers 
should avoid). That we must now, for example, understand the Middle English “rode” as road251 
when applying a Middle English “rode” statute hardly implies that the concept of a road cannot 
unfold through time. Nor does understanding Shakespeare’s use of “Marry” in an original 
archaic sense of expressing “indignant surprise”252 where appropriate mean either (i) that the 
concept of marrying or marriage cannot unfold over time or (ii) that judges and lawmakers 
cannot recognize that sense unfolds over time in the way discussed above.253 Signifier drift 
categorically differs from the unfolding of the sense of concepts, and a careful semiotics avoids 
conflating the two.254  
IX. Some Brief Closing Thoughts on First Amendment Semiotics 
 Grappling with the signifier, the signified, whose meaning should control in various 
situations, and correlations between the signifier and a signified can also help refine free-speech 
analysis.  Although deep explorations of semiotics and free speech are beyond the scope of this 
introductory article on semiotics and the law, I can outline a few remarks on the subject.  These 
remarks presume reasons commonly given for protecting speech: protecting democracy and our 
                                                 
251 See Road, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014). 
252 See 1 ALEXANDER SCHMIDT, SHAKESPEARE LEXICON AND QUOTATION DICTIONARY 696 
(Dover 1971). 
253 See Section III.B.2 above. 
254 See again id. (discussing what Queen Anne may once have meant by “awful, artificial, and 
amusing”).   
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right to self-governance,255 permitting “the search for knowledge and ‘truth’ in the marketplace 
of ideas,”256 protecting “individual autonomy, self-expression, or self-fulfillment,”257 and 
fostering tolerance.258   
 A. Freedom of Speech and Signifier Types 
 Good first amendment jurisprudence recognizes that words are not the only signifiers of 
expression.  The American flag, for example, is no doubt a symbol of America, and burning that 
flag can therefore symbolize, for example, disapproval of America or American policy.  If so 
intended, flag burning can thus be symbolic expression despite Chief Justice Rehnquist’s general 
claim that “flag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say, 
is most likely to be indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others . . . 
.”259  Of course, burning a flag can also be non-symbolic where there is no expressive intent.  
Burning a flag, for example, can be a proper means of flag disposal and need express nothing in 
such a case beyond perhaps the desire to dispose of a flag properly.260  Or, on the other hand, by 
virtue of proper disposal, such flag burning might be seen as great respect for the flag itself or 
the country it represents. 
 
                                                 
255 See generally James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American 
Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011). 
256 Id. at 502 (setting forth the rationale while contending that “a completely unregulated market 
of ideas will lead to discovery of truth is highly contestable”). 
257 Id. at 502-04; Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 443, 498–503 (1998) (“. . . First Amendment analysis [should] attend more self-
consciously to the speaker’s development through expression.”). 
258 Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 984-
85 (1990).  
259 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 432 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
260 4 U.S.C. § 8(k) (2006).  See also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411 (stating that federal law holds 
burning to be the preferred means of disposing of a flag that is no longer fit for display). 
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 B. Freedom of Speech and Harmful Signifiers 
 However, it does not follow from the fact that anything can serve as a signifier that all 
things are fair game for signifiers and free expression as a matter of law.  Again, trademark law 
protects a “word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol used by a manufacturer or seller to 
distinguish its product or products from those of others,”261 copyright law protects “an original 
work of authorship (such as literary, musical, artistic, photographic, for film work) fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression,”262 and criminal law would not permit killing a public official as 
a signifier of political protest.263  In each of these cases, freedom of speech analysis must balance 
the harm of violence to rights or to person against any harm of limiting expression.  Exploring 
such a balance in detail is beyond the scope of this article.  However, I can address below the 
potential fungibility of signifiers as one available balancing tool in certain cases. 
 C. Freedom of Speech and Fungible Signifiers 
 If a non-harmful signifier can signify just as well as a harmful one, a good grasp of 
semiotics supports balancing interests and requiring use of the non-harmful signifier rather than 
                                                 
261 Trademark, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (also noting that “[i]n effect, the 
trademark is the commercial substitute for one’s signature”). 
262 Copyright, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).  One might by copyright analogy 
justify, as a matter of construction, prohibitions against protestors disrupting for political 
expression a funeral designed by others to convey a message of sorrow and good remembrance.  
I have explored other rationales for such restrictions elsewhere.  See generally Lloyd, supra note 
263, 
263 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (“The First Amendment 
does not protect violence.”); United States v. Stevens, 599 U.S. 460, 493 (2010) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it most certainly does not 
protect violent criminal conduct, even if engaged in for expressive purposes.”); United States v. 
Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (“The First Amendment has never been 
construed to protect acts of violence against another individual, regardless of the motivation or 
belief of the perpetrator.”). I have also written elsewhere on restrictions on using living beings as 
signifiers. See Harold A. Lloyd, Crushing Animals and Crashing Funerals: The Semiotics of 
Free Expression, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 237, 244-45, 282-83 (2013). 
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the harmful signifier.  Using the non-harmful signifier, the speaker speaks just as clearly, and 
harm to others is avoided. For example, if burning a copy of a draft card conveys the same sense 
of protest to unwitting viewers conveyed by burning an actual draft card, where is the free-
speech need to damage an official document such as a draft card?264  
 Continuing to balance harms, we can also imagine a cookie baker who offers his famous 
and easily-identifiable cookies for retail sale, who claims that his cookies are his works of art 
celebrating heterosexuality and condemning homosexuality, who has made his views on sexual 
orientation well known, and who therefore refuses to sell his cookies to gay customers.265  In 
other words, he thus claims his cookies are signifiers for expressive (if not also assertive) speech 
acts.266  Given that anything can be a signifier, this sort of example is of great importance if we 
worry that freedom of speech may be used as cover for discrimination or other pernicious 
purposes.  
 Signifier fungibility can provide an answer here as well. The cookie baker can choose 
other signifiers that at least equally convey his celebration of heterosexuality and his 
condemnation of homosexuality, signifiers that in fact might convey such celebration and 
condemnation more precisely.  For example, putting his thoughts and rationales to words can 
perhaps express them more clearly than would such unconventional signifiers such as cookies.  If 
                                                 
264 Discussing this iconic option would have bolstered the Court’s decision upholding a draft 
card mutilation statute in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  Though modern color 
photocopying technology would be easy to make an exact duplicate for burning, prior to such 
technology, a folded piece of paper or one in an envelope, for example, could perhaps have 
passed as the real card before an audience. 
265 Due to space limitations, I discuss this simpler case of the cookie baker who refuses to sell to 
gay customers.  I hope to do a future article on the semiotics of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (involving a wedding cake baker who 
refused to sell a wedding cake to a gay couple). 
266 See Section VI. above. 
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so, requiring other fungible signifiers would thus not require discrimination against gay 
customers while still permitting the baker’s free (and perhaps more precise) expression.  
 If other fungible signifiers exist for his message (including words which may be more 
precise means of expression), how would prohibiting discriminatory cookie sales (i) infringe on 
the baker’s right to speak on matters of public concern, (ii) interfere with the battle of truth in the 
marketplace of ideas, (iii) endanger his right to “self-expression,” or (iv) improperly (after 
balancing the harm of discrimination against the fungibility of signifiers) “circumscribe[e] his 
autonomy and self-fulfillment” as a matter of expression?267   
 Of course, where signifiers are not so reasonably fungible, such lack of reasonable 
fungibility can support the use of such signifiers where, for example, harm to others does not 
outweigh use of such signifiers.  An excellent example of such lack of fungibility would be 
signifiers uniquely conveying emotional meaning, such as Mr. Cohen’s “Fuck the Draft” jacket 
worn in the corridors of the Los Angeles County Courthouse in 1968.268   
  D. Freedom of Speech and Correlation of the Signifier and the Signified 
 Notwithstanding the reasoning above, however, could the cookie baker above reasonably 
argue that some sort of objectionable compelled expression occurs if he must sell his cookies to 
gay people?   
   1. Symbolic Concerns 
 If the cookie baker uses his cookies to celebrate heterosexuality and condemn 
homosexuality, does compelling him to sell his cookies for use at a gay celebration compel him 
                                                 
267 See Section IX. above on reasons offered for free speech protection.  
268 See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).  In that case, Mr. Cohen used that 
phrase to express publically “. . . the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft . 
. . .” Id. at 16.   
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to express a contrary message?  If his cookies are used at such a celebration, do they not now 
convey celebration rather than condemnation? 
 Semiotics helps us see how no compelled expression exists here for at least two reasons.  
First, under the First Interpretation Principle, the cookie baker’s meaning is unimpaired.  The 
baker’s cookies are famous, easily recognizable, and his views are well known.  Second, 
signifiers can be put to non-expressive use without impairing the speaker’s meaning. For 
example, I can use a treatise as a doorstop without impairing or changing the speaker’s meaning.  
Similarly, a gay celebration can put out cookies solely for purposes of refreshment without 
impairing or changing the speaker’s meaning.  As such, again, one cannot reasonably claim that 
sales of cookies to gay people endangers the baker’s right to speak on matters of public concern, 
interferes with the battle of truth in the marketplace of ideas, endangers the baker’s right to “self-
expression,” or “circumscribes” his "autonomy, self-expression, and self-fulfillment" as a matter 
of expression.269   
   2. Additional Indexical Concerns 
 Apart from the meaning the baker attaches to his cookies, if his cookies are used at a gay 
celebration and everyone at the celebration is aware that the cookies came from his bakery, does 
this physical connection with the celebration in itself not indicate either celebration of 
homosexuality or at the very least the baker’s involvement with, and thus approval of, a sexual 
orientation he condemns?  In asking such a question, we are in fact asking at least two indexical 
questions. 
                                                 
269 See the first paragraph above in this Section IX setting out reasons offered for free speech 
protection.  
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 First, we are asking whether the baker's mere physical connection through the sale itself 
indicates views disavowed by the baker.  This is not a difficult question.  On the purely 
transactional level, a retailer simply sells his goods, and the acceptance of the price and tender of 
the goods therefore simply indicate such a sale.  There seems little more to be said on this point 
of pure logic. 
 However, we must also ask whether sale of the cookies could also indicate mental 
attitudes of the baker.  For example, an individual’s donation to a political party may reasonably 
indicate support of that party (although it can indicate other things such as desire to gain favor).  
Though mental states can thus be indicated, it is hard to find indexical expression here of mental 
states supporting the gay party or anything gay at all. Again, the baker is in a retail business and 
thus presumably sells cookies to many whose views he rejects.  It is thus hard to see how the 
default state of mind indicated here is anything more than simply a retail one.  Should one have 
any doubt, the baker’s views on homosexuality are well-known and should thus clarify any such 
doubts.    
 Thus, one cannot reasonably claim that any indexical meaning of sales of cookies to gay 
people endangers the baker’s right to speak on matters of public concern, interferes with the 
battle of truth in the marketplace of ideas, endangers the baker’s right to “self-expression,” or 
“circumscribes” his "autonomy, self-expression, and self-fulfillment."270   
 Due to space limitations, I must end my brief First Amendment comments here.  I hope, 
however, to see others probe such semiotics including courts as they wrestle with the extent and 
limits of freedom of speech. 
                                                 
270 See again the first paragraph above in this Section IX setting out reasons offered for free 
speech protection 
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X. Conclusion: Semiotics and the Middle Path 
 Having now examined the utility and insights of semiotics for those involved in legal 
theory, practice, and education, I end by first pointing out two opposing paths that one might 
wrongly take after an exploration of semiotics.  I then end by noting a sensible semiotics that 
threads between such opposing erroneous paths. 
 Since signifiers can effectively include any concrete, abstract, tangible, or intangible 
thing (such as any “concrete object,” “abstract entity,” “idea or ‘thought,’” “perceptible object,” 
“physical event,” or “imaginable object,)271 and since meaning is not transcendentally given,272 
one must carefully gauge one’s reaction to that vastness of potential signifiers and their potential 
signifieds.   
 Taking such care, one must not abandon all restraint and believe that one can assert, 
direct, commit, declare, or express273 anything as signified with anything as signifier.  As I have 
written before, both semantic and pre-semantic experience would push back against such 
unlimited license.274  For example, if one steals a trademark, directs actions with words that no 
one can understand, or claims to a police officer that “stop” means “go,” one may well 
experience failure or loss.  
 On the other hand, one must not cower in the face of that vastness of potential signifiers 
and signifieds by seeking comfort in wrong beliefs275 in formalism (i.e., in beliefs that the law is 
“a self-contained system of legal reasoning” involving deduction of “neutral” and apolitical 
                                                 
271 See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 80. See also PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.230. 
272 See Section III. B. 1. a. above. 
273 See Section VI. above on the various types of speech (semiotic) acts. 
274 Lloyd, supra note 27, at 222-50. 
275 See id. at 210-22 (describing various freedoms we have in, for example, framing, creating 
meaning, and adjusting categories). 
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results from “general principles and analogies among cases and doctrines.”276)  Again, since 
referents and sense are not transcendentally given, and since reality is “internal” to our semantic 
lifeworlds,277 we can always have hope of seeking change where progress requires.  
Additionally, since sense itself unfolds in experience over time, one cannot speak of the law in 
any meaningful way as a “self-contained” system severed from such unfolding of sense in 
experience over time.  
 Unlike the approaches above, a sensible semiotics must by definition actually work.278  It 
must take a middle path between (i) formalism lost in a “self-contained” system impossibly 
severed from the unfolding of sense in experience and (ii) any semiotics of unlimited license.  
Semiotics shows us that such a middle path must also be a “hermeneutic” path, i.e., a path 
involving interpretation.  One cannot workably address what one does not understand.  To 
understand, one must have workable notions of both meaning and interpretation which allow one 
to “present [something] in understandable terms” and “to explain or tell the meaning of [that 
something].”279  I have therefore called this middle path “hermeneutic pragmatism” to reflect 
both the required pragmatism and the required understanding of meaning and interpretation.280  
In this middle path, in this sensible semiotics, in this hermeneutic pragmatism lies law’s soundest 
way to achieving sensible and ever-unfolding justice and rule of law.  
                                                 
276 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 16-17 (1992) (defining formalism).  
277 See again Lloyd, supra note 27, at 210-22, 232-34; PUTNAM, supra note 33, at 114 (the 
internal realist “is willing to think of reference as internal to ‘texts’ (or theories), provided we 
recognize that there are better and worse ‘texts.’ ‘Better’ and ‘worse’ may themselves depend on 
our historical situation and our purposes; there is no notion of a God's-Eye View of Truth here . . 
. . ). 
278 I have addressed workability in detail elsewhere.  See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 264-74. 
279 See Interpret, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed.  2014) 
280 See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 201-02. 
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Appendix 
Some Further Useful Terms and Concepts 
I. Three Subdivisions of Semiotics 
 Charles Morris classically provides a useful definition of three subdivisions of semiotics: 
pragmatics, semantics, and syntactics.   
 Pragmatics "is that portion of semiotic which deals with the origin, uses, and effects of 
signs within the behavior in which they occur."281  Understanding pragmatics as the study of how 
individuals in actual practice use words and other signs, I have written in detail about the subject 
elsewhere and will therefore not explore in detail in this article many of the matters I have 
previously addressed.282  Pragmatics is, of course, an extremely important subdivision of 
semiotics for lawyers.  Much of what we do involves how a particular person or entity used 
language, such as struggling with what they meant by a word or words which they used.  
 Semantics "deals with the signification of signs in all modes of signifying," and 
syntactics "deals with combinations of signs without regard for their specific significations or 
their relation to the behavior in which they occur."283  This article explores semantics to the 
extent it explores the signified but does not explore syntactics.284  
II. Semiosis vs. Semiology and Tokens vs. Types 
 To help readers as they explore semiotics further, I note here three distinctions readers 
will likely encounter. 
                                                 
281 MORRIS, SIGNS, LANGUAGE AND BEHAVIOR 219 (1946). 
282 See generally Lloyd, supra note 5. 
283 Id. 
284 Nöth describes the three branches as follows using “sign vehicle” for “signifier”: syntactics 
"studies the relation between a given sign vehicle and other sign vehicles," semantics "studies the 
relations between sign vehicles and their designata," and pragmatics "studies the relation 
between sign vehicles and their interpreters." NÖTH, supra note 8, at 50. 
 87 
 
 First is the distinction between "semiotics" and "semiosis."  "Semiosis" is "the process of 
meaning-making"; this includes meaning making involved in the interaction of the signified and 
signifier.285  The term also refers to "signification as a process" or "the activity of signs”286 and 
“the process of sign interpretation.”287  It can also mean “any sign action or sign process” or 
“activity of a sign.”288 
 Second is the distinction readers may see between "semiotics" (referring to work within 
the tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce, which tradition this article follows) and “semiology” 
(referring to work within the tradition of Ferdinand de Saussure).289  Saussure’s views290 are 
generally beyond the scope of this paper, which again follows the tradition of Peirce.   
 Third is the distinction between tokens and types.  As Nöth puts it, "A sign in its singular 
occurrence is a token, whereas the sign as a general law or rule underlying its use is a type." 291  
Taking the word "fast" as an example: "As a word of the English language it is a type.  Every 
written or spoken instance of that is a token."292  Thus, if a paragraph uses the word "contract" 
four times, there will be four tokens of the English language word. 
                                                 
285 See CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 259 (referring in Peircean fashion to the signifier as 
“representamen” and the signified as "the object and the interpretant”). 
286 Semiosis, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEMIOTICS (Paul Bouissac ed., 1998). 
287 Short, supra note 74, at 105. 
288 VINCENT M. COLAPIETRO, GLOSSARY OF SEMIOTICS 178 (Paragon House 1993) (bolding 
omitted). 
289 See CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 259. 
290 Saussure took a synchronic approach to semiotics thus studying "a phenomenon (such as a 
code) as if it were frozen at one moment in time.”  Id. at 262.  Consistent with this, he 
distinguished between (i) “langue” as an "abstract system of rules and conventions of a 
signifying system [that] is independent of, and preexist, individual users” and (ii) “parole” which 
"refers to concrete instances of [language's] use."  Id. at 252.  As I see semiotics and language as 
live (even though they carry potentially-challengeable traditions and ready-made concepts and 
schemas), I therefore see Saussure’s approach as quite wrong. 
291 NÖTH, supra note 8, at 81. 
292 See id. 
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III. Signs and Lifeworlds 
 
 Lawyers exploring semiotics in any depth will encounter the terms Lebenswelt (or 
lifeworld), Umwelt, and Innenwelt.  Although the first of these three terms is likely familiar to 
many lawyers, I will briefly address all three terms.  Assuming that language shapes 
experience,293 I favor Putnam’s definition of the “lifeworld” or “Lebenswelt” as “the world as we 
actually experience it.”294  As I would define the term, such a lifeworld includes both the 
technical as well as the non-technical.295  It includes interpretive groups that are “nested” within 
others; thus, the American legal community, for example, “is surrounded by the political 
community, social community, and ultimately the entire interpretive community of American 
and perhaps international culture.”296   Lifeworlds are therefore complex webs of meaning where 
                                                 
293 I agree with Rorty that: “The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only 
descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own—unaided by the describing 
activities of human beings—cannot.”  RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 
5 (1989).  Similarly, Gadamer claims that language is “the all-embracing form of the constitution 
of the world” and on language “depends the fact that man has a world at all.”  GADAMER, supra 
note 98, at 440.  
294 See PUTNAM, supra note 33, at 118.  Lacking the space to give an extensive history of the use 
of this term, I would briefly point back to Husserl.  Smith gives useful definitions in Husserl’s 
context: “Lebenswelt” is “the life-world, the world of everyday life, the surrounding world as 
experienced in everyday life” and “life-world” is “the surrounding world as experienced in 
everyday life, including ‘spiritual’ or cultural, that is, social, activities.”  DAVID WOODRUFF 
SMITH, HUSSERL 437 (2007). 
295 See CHAÏM PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON 
ARGUMENTATION 99 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969) (beside other linguistic 
beliefs lie “agreements that are peculiar to the members of a particular discipline, whether it be 
of scientific or technical, juridical or theological nature.  Such agreements constitute the body of 
a science or technique”). 
296 BENSON, supra note 142, at 74. Thus, Benson also describes Stanley Fish’s notion "that we all 
live in ‘interpretive communities’ which are made up of a ‘political, social and institutional . . . 
mix’ of constraints on acceptable interpretations."  Id.  See also PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-
TYTECA, supra note 295, at 513 (“All language is the language of a community, be this a 
community bound by biological ties, or by the practice of a common discipline or technique.  
The terms used, their meaning, their definition, can only be understood in the context of the 
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change generally requires justifications acceptable to the appropriate members of the nested 
communities.297  For example, competent lawyer members of such complex webs will push back 
on claims, for example, that “due process” is a meaningless term.   
 “Umwelt” is “[t]he environment  selectively reconstituted and organized according to the 
specific needs and interests of the individual organism . . . .”298  Put another way, “Umwelt” is 
the “environment insofar as an organism is equipped to perceive it” and is thus “not simply what 
is objectively there, but only what is perceptually and operationally available to the organism.”299  
As to the relation of Umwelt to Lebenswelt, Deely notes “the specifically human Umwelt” is 
called by some the Lebenswelt.300    
 According to Deely, the Umwelt “depends upon and corresponds to” an Innenwelt.301 An 
Innenwelt  is a “cognitive map, developed within each individual” that “enables the individual to 
find its way in the environment and insert itself into a network of communication, interest, and 
livelihood shareable especially with the several other individuals of its own kind.”302   
IV. Charity and Related Notions  
 Consistent with rational interaction, both the  First Interpretation Principle and the 
Second Interpretation Principle assume  that speakers acting in good faith wish to speak 
                                                                                                                                                             
habits, ways of thought, methods, external circumstances, and traditions known to the users of 
the terms.”). 
297 See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 295, at 513 (“A deviation from usage 
requires justification . . . .”). 
298 DEELY, supra note 49, at 59-60. 
299 COLAPIETRO, supra note 288, at 201 (Paragon House 1993). 
300 DEELY, supra note 49, at 60.  
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
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relevantly in the speech situation at hand.303  That is, they assume that speakers acting in good 
faith by definition wish to speak in a way that “can be interpreted as contributing to the 
conversational [or other]l goals” of the speaker or hearer.304  Consistent with this, the First 
Interpretation Principle and the Second Interpretation Principle assume that, if a speaker wishes 
to be relevant, she by definition would not generally intend to speak wrongly, irrationally, or 
incoherently, even if her words or other signs could be interpreted as wrong, irrational, or 
incoherent.305  This therefore leads us to a principle of balance or charity that generally infers a 
rational and coherent meaning where possible unless we have  reasons to believe otherwise.306  
V. The Pre-Socratics to Peirce: Semeion, Symbolum, Signum, and Icon  
 Semiotics has an ancient pedigree. Tracing its lines in simplest of terms, one can note the 
ancient Greek fascination with the indexical.  Pre-Socratics such as Parmenides and Heraclitus 
understood the Greek term “semeion” or sign in the sense of evidence or “tekmerion” which 
explains why Hippocrates, for example, focused on symptoms as signs of diseases.307 In addition 
to this indexical understanding of “semeion” (whose “paradigm was medical symptoms such as 
                                                 
303 See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 27 (1989).  I expand Grice here with my 
bracketed language. 
304 CRUSE, supra note 131, at 419 (quoting G. N. LEECH, PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMATICS (1983)).  
305 See DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 27 (1984). See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“An interpretation 
which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an 
interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect.”). 
306 As Kent Greenawalt nicely tells us: “What I would hope from an interpreter [who has found 
statements that seem contradictory or at odds with the remainder of a piece] is that if she could 
figure out which statement did fit my overall position best and which reflected a lapse in how I 
have expressed myself, she would say, ‘Greenawalt probably means X (or would think X) 
though one of his sentences points in a different direction.’”  GREENAWALT, supra note 190, at 
82. 
307 See CLARKE, supra note 10, at 2-3, 11-13.  
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spots),”308 one also encounters “symbolos” used for sentences and words.309  Both the index and 
the symbol securely fell under the umbrella of “sign” once St. Augustine famously used 
“signum” to include “both the evidential signs of the Greeks and words as linguistic signs used in 
communication.”310 Further filling out sign types, St. Bonaventura and others explored iconic 
signs.311  Peirce designed his subsequent “classification of signs into icons, indices, and symbols 
. . . to incorporate the principal types of signs discussed in the tradition he inherited.”312 Thus, 
lawyers who use and appreciate semiotics today stand on the shoulders of giants from the 
pre-Socratics to Peirce and beyond.  Unfortunately, I lack of space to explore historical 
semiotics in more detail here but hope this brief summary will entice readers to explore more 
such history on their own.313 
                                                 
308 COLAPIETROA, supra note 288, at 177-178  
309
 CLARKE, supra note 10, at 3; COLAPIETROA, supra note 288, at 177-178 (noting that “this 
distinction between sign and symbol was in ancient Greek usage not always clearly or 
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